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TAXATION AND SURVEILLANCE: AN AGENDA
Michael Hatfield *
17 YALE J.L. & TECH. 319 (2015)

The IRS has always been an information
intensive enterprise. But it’s the organization of
data and ultimately the knowledge and
intelligence we extract from the information we
receive that really matters. It can show us the
areas of greatest non-compliance . . . and
thereby, contributes to more efficient and
effective compliance programs.
– IRS Commissioner Doug Schulman (2011)1

Every animate and inanimate object on earth
will soon be generating data, including our
homes, our cars, and, yes, even our bodies.
– THE HUMAN FACE OF BIG DATA (2012)2

ABSTRACT

Among government agencies, the IRS likely has the surest
legal claim to the most information about the most Americans:
their hobbies, religious affiliations, reading activities, travel,
and medical information are all potentially tax relevant.
Privacy scholars have studied the arrival of Big Data, the
internet-of-things, and the cooperation of private companies
with the government in surveillance, but neither privacy nor
tax scholars have considered how these technological advances
should impact the U.S. tax system. As government agencies
and private companies increasingly pursue what has been
described as the “growing gush of data,” the use of these
*
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technologies in tax administration will become increasingly
important to consider. This Article provides an agenda of items
for discussion, debate, and research related to the development,
implementation, and effects of a surveillance-facilitated tax
system.
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Introduction

Although the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) “has always
been an information intensive agency,” 3 its informationgathering has never been the focus of privacy scholars. Those
3

Schulman, supra note 1.
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scholars have instead focused on agencies such as the National
Security Administration (NSA).4 But the IRS’s legal claim to
private information is remarkable. It is entitled to collect
information about who sleeps how often in your house,5 your
hobbies,6 your reading preferences,7 your religious affiliation,8
your travel plans, 9 your weight and your doctor’s
recommendations about it,10 your spouse or your dependent’s
abortion, sterilization, 11 or gender identity disorder, 12 and if
4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

See, e.g., David Gray & Danielle Citron, The Right to Quantitative
Privacy, 98 MINN. L. REV. 62 (2013) [hereinafter Gray & Citron,
Quantitative Privacy]; Danielle Keats Citron & David Gray, Addressing
the Harm of Total Surveillance: A Reply to Professor Neil Richards, 126
HARV. L. REV. 262 (2013) [hereinafter Citron & Gray, Total Surveillance];
Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934
(2013).
This information may be relevant to determining tax consequences of
payments to a separated spouse who is living in the house and
dependency status in the case of a child. See I.R.C. § 71(b)(1) (West 2014)
(defining alimony payments to a separated spouse who is in the same
household as not excludable from income); I.R.C. § 152(c)(1)(B) (West
2014) (defining a qualifying child as a dependent residing at the same
principal place of abode as the taxpayer for more than one-half of the
year); and Treas. Reg. § 1.152-1(b) (1971) (defining the dependent
including special circumstances of absences of less than 6 months).
See Treas. Reg. § 1.183-1 (1972) (listing factors for determining if an
activity is a hobby for which losses are not deductible).
Reading habits may be relevant, for example, to determine whether or not
one has undertaken an activity with a motive of making a profit. See, e.g.,
Nickerson v. Comm’r, 700 F.2d 402 (7th Cir. 1983) (stating that facts
including a taxpayer’s reading about farming were evidence that he
pursued that activity with a profit-seeking motive).
Not only may financial support of religious organizations be tax relevant,
but also the distance from a taxpayer’s home to any of her religious
organizations. See I.R.C. § 170(b)(1) (West 2014) (covering charitable
contributions and gifts to a church or convention or association of
churches); Treas. Reg. § 1.121-1(b) (2002) (stating that location of religious
organization with which taxpayer affiliates is relevant to determining
principal residence for gain exclusion).
For example, was the travel for personal, business, educational, or
medical purposes—or some combination? I.R.C § 213(d)(1)-(d)(2) (West
2014) (stating that transportation and lodging expenses for medical care
are deductible); Treas. Reg. § 1.162-2 (1960) (covering travel for business,
mixed business, and personal reasons); and Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b) (1967)
(covering travel as a form of education).
See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 80-04-111 (Oct. 31, 1979) (setting out weight loss
program fees as deductible where prescribed by physicians for the
alleviation of specific ailments); Rev. Rul. 79-151, 1979-1 C.B. 116 (noting
that weight loss program fees are not deductible even though physicianrecommended where not prescribed for the alleviation of specific ailment).
See Rev. Rul. 73-201, 1973-1 C.B. 140 (deeming legal abortions and
vasectomies deductible medical care under I.R.C. § 213).
See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 2003-57, 2003-22 I.R.B. 959 (deeming breast
reconstruction following mastectomy to be deductible). But see
O'Donnabhain v. Comm’r, 134 T.C. No. 4 (2010) (finding that hormone
therapy and sex reassignment surgery are deductible expenses to treat
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you were considering a carnal quid pro quo when you made a
gift to your “mistress.”13 Yet, privacy scholars have taken no
note of the IRS’s extraordinary legal claim to such information.
From the reverse angle, despite the information-intensive
aspects of tax law, tax scholars have not taken note of the
increasing pervasiveness of information technology. 14 Modern
technologies are creating “minutely detailed records” of our
existence,15 increasingly facilitating the “persistent, continuous
and indiscriminate monitoring of our daily lives.” 16 One
information privacy scholar described the radical and
technological transformation of personal information:
The small details that were once captured in dim
memories or fading scraps of paper are now
preserved forever in the digital minds of
computers, vast databases with fertile fields
of personal data . . . . Every day, rivulets of
information stream into electronic brains to be
sifted, sorted, rearranged, and combined in
hundreds of different ways. Technology enables
the preservation of the minutia of our everyday
comings and goings, of our likes and dislikes, of
who we are and what we are . . . . It is ever
more possible to create an electronic collage that
covers much of a person’s life—a life captured in
records, a digital biography composed in the
collective computer networks of the world.17
A prominent national security advisor has predicted that by
2040, all of our daily activities will be known by “governmental

13

14

15
16
17

“gender identity disorder” disease, but that breast augmentation was
merely cosmetic and not a deductible expense).
Transfers to a sexual partner may be characterized as either non-taxable
gifts or as taxable compensation for sexual activity. See, e.g., United
States v. Harris, 942 F.2d 1125, 1131-1135 (7th Cir. 1991) (reviewing the
“current law on the tax treatment of payments to mistresses”).
Tax scholars have not considered the relevance to tax administration of
the Big Data revolution, the rise of the internet-of-things, or other aspects
of the information technology revolution. While some scholars have
addressed “tax privacy,” their primary focus is determining the conditions
for IRS disclosure of individual income tax return information. See, e.g.,
Joshua D. Blank, In Defense of Individual Tax Privacy, 61 EMORY L. J.
265 (2011); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Doing the Full Monty: Will
Publicizing Tax Information Increase Compliance? 18 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 1
(2005); Marc Linder, Tax Glasnost for Millionaires: Peeking Behind the
Veil of Ignorance Along the Publicity-Privacy Continuum, 18 N.Y.U. REV.
L. & SOC. CHANGE 951 (1990); and Stephen W. Mazza, Taxpayer Privacy
and Tax Compliance, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 1065 (2002).
Richards, supra note 4, at 1934.
Citron & Gray, Total Surveillance, supra note 4 at 274.
Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power:
Computer Databases and
Metaphors for Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1394 (2001).
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and corporate entities” pursuing the “growing gush of data”
from the “internet of things.” 18 As we move towards such a
future, the IRS most likely will be among those entities
pursuing this growing gush of data. This Article suggests an
agenda for discussion among privacy and tax law scholars:
issues we ought to consider, research we ought to pursue, and
debates we ought to have.
In Part I of this Article, I describe the flow of tax-relevant
information from taxpayers and third parties to the IRS. I
point out two significant problems in that information flow: the
compliance burden and the compliance gap. In Part II, I predict
that, over the next twenty-five years, surveillance technologies
will be used to reduce the compliance burden and gap. I
consider the technological and political factors that may pave
or block the way for such an increase in surveillance to improve
tax administration. In Part III, I recommend a research agenda
in an effort to make the integration of surveillance into tax
administration more beneficial than harmful. Ultimately,
reforming tax law to fit the emerging technology and our
privacy expectations will be essential to integrating the
information technology revolution into tax administration
without disrupting the administration itself.
I.

The Tax Information Flow and Gap

In this Part, I describe the information needed to prepare
and file an individual’s income tax return. The IRS is legally
entitled to a great deal of information from a taxpayer. But in
practice, very little information is turned over, mostly due to
the extremely low audit rate of less than one percent. 19
The tax-return-preparation burden on individuals is quite
substantial, amounting to about 7.6 billion work hours a year.20
And about $450 billion of tax revenue is lost each year due to
taxpayers’ failure to comply with the tax law.21 Both of these
problems are ameliorated when third parties provide taxrelevant information to both the taxpayers and the IRS. Thus,
third-party reporting of information has become essential to
the administration of the individual income tax. In Section A, I
describe the current system of providing individual income tax
information to the IRS. 22 In Section B, I highlight problems
18

Richard Clarke, Richard Clarke on the Future of Privacy: Only the Rich
Will Have It, WALL ST. J., July 7, 2014, http://online.wsj.com/articles/rich

19

See infra note 29.
See infra notes 80-81.
See infra note 100.

ard-clarke-on-the-future-of-privacy-only-the-rich-will-have-it-1404762349.
20
21
22

I am concerned only with the individual income tax, which is the single
largest source of revenue for collection and returns for processing by the
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that reflect the information gap between the taxpayer and the
IRS and that lead to a great loss of tax revenue.
A.

How the IRS Acquires Taxpayer Information

On one hand, the IRS is entitled to any information that
may be relevant to determining any tax liability, 23 so it has
tremendously broad legal authority to demand information. On
the other hand, for a variety of reasons, especially the very low
audit rate, relatively little information beyond the numbers on
the face of the tax return is ever provided. The following
describes the current system of providing individual tax
information to the IRS.
1.

Information Provided by the Taxpayer

To understand how information is provided to the IRS, it is
important to understand the individual income tax return
preparation and filing process. After the close of each year, any
individual with gross annual income exceeding a certain
amount must file an income tax return. 24 About 145 million
individual income tax returns are filed annually. 25 The
taxpayer is responsible for learning the relevant law, gathering
the relevant factual information, and applying the law to the
facts as necessary to determine and report his or her liability
for the year. This can be very complicated. For example, a
taxpayer who pays for work on the roof of a business
warehouse must navigate detailed treasury regulations to
determine whether the expense should be deducted or
capitalized.26 The return does not require disclosure of the legal

23

24

25

26

IRS, and, as a tax on individuals, raises the most complex privacy issues.
See The Agency, Its Mission and Statutory Authority, INTERNAL REVENUE
SERV.,
http://www.irs.gov/uac/The-Agency,-its-Mission-and-StatutoryAuthority (last visited Apr. 13, 2015) (stating that the IRS collected over
$2.5 trillion and processed over 237 million returns in 2012).
I.R.C. § 7602 (West 2014) (defining the examination of books and records);
Id. § 7801 (defining the authority of Treasury Department); Id. § 7803
(outlining the duties and authority of the IRS Commissioner).
Id. § 6012 (defining persons required to make returns of income). An
individual with gross income not exceeding the sum of the exemption and
standard deduction need not file a return. Id. § 6012(a). For 2014, this
threshold amount was $10,500 for a single individual. INTERNAL REVENUE
SERV., 1040 INSTRUCTIONS 2013, at 7 ch. A, http://www.irs.gov/pub/irsprior/i1040--2013.pdf.
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., SOI TAX STATS—INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX
RETURNS PUBLICATION 1304 tbl.1.1, 2012, http://www.irs.gov/uac/SOI-TaxStats-Individual-Income-Tax-Returns-Publication-1304-(Complete-Report)
(last updated Aug. 22, 2014). [hereinafter, IRS, SOI Tax Stats]. This
number includes returns filed by both single taxpayers and married
taxpayers.
This requires determining if the work should be characterized as a repair,
betterment, restoration, or adaptation. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-4(a) (2014)
(deeming the cost of repairs deductible in most cases); Treas. Reg.
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analysis behind a taxpayer’s characterization (e.g., that the
expense is deductible), nor does it require the taxpayer to
supplement the return with the underlying supporting
information (e.g., receipts).27 For the most part, the return only
requires numbers the taxpayer has concluded to be the legally
correct ones (e.g., the amount deductible). Once the return is
filed, it is subject to an automated review which checks for
mathematical errors and compares the information on the
return with information the IRS has obtained elsewhere.28 Less
than one percent of individual tax returns are ever audited.29
In the rare case that a taxpayer is audited, the IRS may
demand that the taxpayer provide more information than
provided with the return. The taxpayer is obligated to maintain
the records necessary to substantiate what he or she
determined to be the tax liability,30 and the IRS is entitled to
examine “any books, papers, records, or other data which may
be relevant” to determining any tax liability.31 As part of its
audit, the IRS may penalize the taxpayer for failing to

27

28

29

30

31

§ 1.236(a)-3(d) (2013) (defining betterments, restorations, and adaptions of
property as capitalized rather than deducted); Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-3(j),
Ex. 13 (2014) (using the example of roof betterment); Treas. Reg.
§1.263(a)-3(k), Ex. 14 (2014) (using the example of roof restoration).
When assembling his or her Form 1040, a taxpayer is to submit only items
specifically required. The Form 1040 does not require the taxpayer to
submit his or her legal reasoning in support of any deductions, nor does it
require submission of receipts associated with deducted expenses. See
1040 INSTRUCTIONS 2013, supra note 26 at 72 (instructing taxpayers to
submit only the materials required).
See Caroline Rule, BNA Tax Management Portfolio 623-3rd: IRS
Procedures: Examinations and Appeals, Section IB (2013) (describing the
mostly automated review of all tax returns).
In 2012, 99.1% of individual tax returns were not audited. While audit
rates went up with income, a full 70% of returns reporting over ten
million in income were not audited. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., INTERNAL
REVENUE SERVICE DATA BOOK 2012, tbl. 1 (Steven T. Miller et al. eds.,
2012). The IRS aims to audit only those returns it determines likely to
have errors. See Rule, supra note 30, Section IIA (describing how returns
are selected for further examination).
With respect to this tax-relevant information, Congress has granted the
Treasury broad authority to prescribe the taxpayer’s obligations to
provide the information. I.R.C. § 6001 (West 2014). The Secretary is
entitled to require any person to “make such returns, render such
statements, or keep such records as the Secretary deems sufficient to
show whether or not such person” has an income tax liability, and every
person who does have an income tax liability must “keep such records,
render such statements, make such returns, and comply with such rules
and regulations as the Secretary” prescribes. Treas. Reg. § 1.6001-1(a)
(1990); see also MARTIN J. MCMAHON & LAWRENCE A. ZELENAK, FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS ¶ 39.01[8] (Thomson Reuters ed., 2013).
I.R.C. § 7602 (West 2014) (defining the examination of books and records);
Id. § 7801 (defining the authority of Treasury Department); Id. § 7803
(outlining the duties and authority of the IRS Commissioner).
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maintain the adequate records32 or for failing to have a suitably
strong legal argument for the disputed characterization (e.g.,
the claim that an expense is deductible).33 If the taxpayer and
IRS are unable to resolve their differences during the audit, the
dispute may then be litigated in court.
In preparing his or her return, the taxpayer bears the
burden of interpreting the law, gathering the factual
information, and applying the law to it. The relevance of
information is laid out in multiple sources and in varying levels
of detail. The Internal Revenue Code, Treasury Regulations,
administrative rulings and publications, and court cases all
determine what information is relevant under a given
provision. 34 Determining the individual’s taxable income
requires all information necessary to determine if a receipt or
benefit is includible in or excludible from income, whether or
not an expense is deductible from income, and which credits, if
any, reduce the tentative tax liability. 35 Some of the
information required for determining taxable income is simple,
such as the amount of a taxpayer’s paycheck. 36 Other
32

33

34

35

36

See, e.g., id. § 7203 (deeming failure to keep required records to be a
misdemeanor).
For example, the taxpayer is subject to a penalty for a substantial
understatement of income tax, I.R.C. § 6662(b)(2) (West 2014), except to
the extent that the underlying position had substantial authority or was
disclosed with the return and had a reasonable basis, id.
§ 6662(d)(2)(B).
For example, I.R.C. § 213 provides specific definitions that must be
satisfied for medical expenses to be deductible. The Treasury Regulations
require submission of whatever information “the district director may
deem necessary” to determine the deductibility of a medical expense.
Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1(f) (1979) (outlining substantiation requirements,
including “the nature of any other item of expense and for whom incurred
and for what specific purpose, the amount paid therefor and the date of
the payment thereof”). The relevant information is then discussed on four
of the more than two hundred pages of instructions for the 1040. See 1040
INSTRUCTIONS 2013, supra note 24, at 5, A-1, A-2, and A-3 (discussing
medical expenses). Relevant information is also covered in more detail in
a special thirty-five page publication. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.,
PUBLICATION 502: MEDICAL AND DENTAL EXPENSES: FOR USE IN PREPARING
2014 RETURNS (2014). For some specific expenses, additional
administrative rulings have been issued regarding relevant information.
See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 79-151, 1979-1 C.B. 116 (establishing that weight loss
program fees are not deductible even if recommended by a physician).
Similarly, the courts have addressed what is relevant. See O’Donnabhain
v. Comm’r, 134 T.C. No. 4 (2010) (holding that the treatment of “gender
identity disorder” disease, hormone therapy and sex reassignment surgery
were deductible expenses, but that breast augmentation was merely
cosmetic and not a deductible expense).
See I.R.C. § 61 (West 2014) (defining gross income); id. § 63 (defining
taxable income); id. §§ 51-53 (defining credits against tax); id. §§ 101-140
(defining exclusions from income); id. §§ 161-210 (defining deductions
against income).
Id. § 61 (stating that gross income includes compensation for services).
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information required is complex, such as the taxpayer’s reason
for taking a trip 37 or making a gift. 38 Some information is
strictly necessary, such as the purchase price of an asset. 39
Other information is necessary only for administrative safe
harbors, such as those for excluding gain on the sale of a
residence 40 or characterizing an investment as active rather
than passive. 41 Some of the information is relatively public,
such as one’s address. Other information is intensely private,
such as information related to the medical care of oneself or
one’s family members.42
While a tremendous amount of information may be relevant
and may be subject to review by the IRS in the event of an
audit, audits are exceedingly rare. In almost all cases the only
information that the taxpayer provides to the IRS is what is
provided on the face of the return and as a supplement to it
(such as the Form W2 from the taxpayer’s employer). More
information is only provided if the IRS requests it. Thus, much
of the relevant information never flows into the IRS. For
example, though the information recording requirements for
charitable contributions are fairly detailed, 43 none of those
records are submitted with the return.44 The taxpayer claiming
the charitable contribution deduction is obligated to maintain
records and provide them to the IRS if requested.
But it is not only the low audit rate that reduces the
amount of tax-relevant information actually provided to the
IRS for review. In order to lessen the burden on the taxpayer
37

38

39
40

41

42

43
44

Whether a trip is primarily for business or personal purposes determines
the deductibility of travel expenses under I.R.C. § 162. See Treas. Reg.
§ 1.162-2(a) (1960) (establishing that whether one undertakes trips for
purposes other than business or solely for business purposes affects
whether the expenses for said trip are tax deductible).
To be excluded from income under I.R.C. § 102 (excluding gifts inter alia),
the transferor’s motive must be one of detached and disinterested
generosity. Comm’r v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 285 (1960).
I.R.C. § 1012 (West 2014) (defining the cost basis of property).
See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.121-3 (2004) (outlining safe harbors for reduced
maximum exclusions for taxpayers who fail to meet certain requirements).
See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.469-5T(a)(1) (1996) (setting the threshold for
temporary material participation at more than five hundred hours spent
on an activity in a year).
See I.R.C. § 213 (West 2014); see also, e.g., id. § 213(d)(3) (listing
prescribed drugs as deductible medical expenses); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8004-111 (Oct. 31, 1979) (deeming weight loss program fees deductible
where prescribed by physicians for alleviation of specific ailments); Rev.
Rul. 79-151, 1979-1 C.B. 116 (stating that weight loss program fees are
not deductible even though physician-recommended if not prescribed for
alleviation of specific ailment); and Rev. Rul. 55-261, 1955-1 C.B. 307
(stating that health club fees may be deductible if prescribed for
alleviation of specific ailment).
See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-13 (1996).
2013 1040 INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 24, at A-9 .
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and to simplify tax administration, Congress has reduced the
amount of tax-relevant information for many taxpayers.
Congress has done this through the standard deduction
mechanism. More than two-thirds of individual taxpayers
choose the single (and simple) standard deduction in lieu of
multiple (and complex) itemized deductions.45 While there is a
great deal of information relevant to claiming itemized
deductions, much less information is required for those
taxpayers electing the standard deduction. However, while the
standard deduction reduces a taxpayer’s information burden, it
does not eliminate it. 46 Information is still required to
determine the taxpayer’s filing status, 47 qualifying
dependents,48 inclusions49 and exclusions50 from the taxpayer’s
income, available credits,51 and a fair number of deductions not
precluded by the standard deduction, such as for business
expenses, 52 alimony payments, 53 moving expenses, 54 and
education expenses.55
Arguably, a taxpayer who does not want to subject certain
information to IRS review could simply forego the related
deduction or credit. For example, a taxpayer who does not want
the IRS to have the right to review the details of his or her
charitable support simply might choose not to claim the

45

46

47

48
49

50

51
52

53

54

55

For the most recent year reported, 2012, sixty-seven percent of individual
income tax returns reported the standard rather than itemized
deductions. IRS, SOI Tax Stats, supra note 25, tbl 1.2
When taking the standard deduction, the taxpayer is precluded from
taking itemized deductions. I.R.C. § 63(b) (West 2014) (defining taxable
income for individuals who do not itemize deductions); see also MCMAHON
AND ZELENAK, supra note 30, ¶ 21.04. Itemized deductions are all
deductions, other than the above-the-line deduction in I.R.C. § 62(a) and
the personal exemption deduction in I.R.C. § 151. See I.R.C. § 63(d) (West
2014).
See I.R.C. § 1 (West 2014) (setting forth different tax tables based on the
taxpayer’s filing status).
See Id. § 152 (defining qualifying child or relative).
Id. §§ 71, 74, 83 (describing alimony and separate maintenance, prizes
and awards, and property transferred in connection with performance of
services, respectively).
Id. §§ 102, 121, 132 (describing gifts and inheritances, exclusion of gain
from sale of principal residence, and certain fringe benefits, respectively).
Id. §§ 32, 36 (describing earned income and first-time home buyer credt).
Id. § 62(a)(1) (defining trade and business deductions to be used in
computing adjusted gross income).
Id. § 62(a)(10) (listing deduction for alimony as provided in I.R.C. § 215 in
computed adjusted gross income).
Id. § 62(a)(15) (listing moving expense deduction in computing adjusted
gross income as provided in I.R.C. § 217).
Id. § 62(a)(17)-(18) (listing educational loan interest deduction as provided
in I.R.C. §§ 221 and educational expense deductions as provided in I.R.C.
§ 222 in computing adjusted gross income).
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charitable contribution deduction. 56 However, this is not as
simple as it may seem at first. Some lawyers argue that no part
of the statutory formula for determining tax liability is
optional. They emphasize that the formula is arithmetic:
exclusions are excluded, inclusions are included, deductions are
deducted, and credits are credited.57 But, theories aside, in fact,
taxpayers often forego deductions for which they qualify.
Sometimes they do so for strategic reasons, such as limiting
their (perceived) audit risk or reserving some deductions to
claim in settlement negotiations of multiple issues if the return
is audited.58 Sometimes they do so in an effort to keep certain
information from being subject to IRS review.59 Perhaps most
of all, however, they do so out of ignorance of the deductions
available to them.
Another complication in IRS information collection is that
otherwise relevant information available for IRS review may
become irrelevant as a result of computational mechanics.
For example, in the case of the “miscellaneous itemized
deductions,” none of the deductions can be taken unless all of
the deductions together exceed a percentage of the taxpayer’s
adjusted gross income. 60 Similarly, taxpayers with income
exceeding certain amounts may not be entitled to claim certain
deductions or credits, such as the deduction on qualified
education loans61 or the Hope Scholarship Credit.62 Taxpayers
who otherwise would qualify for deductions or credits will have
the relevant information become irrelevant if they fail to
qualify due to excessive income. Some deductions are available
for only substantial expenditures, such as the medical expense
56

57

58
59

60

61

62

See James Edward Maule, No Thanks Uncle Sam, You Can Keep Your
Tax Break, 31 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 81, 91 (2006).
Id. at 83-84 (characterizing the debate over the obligatory nature of
deductions as one of the deepest, most intense, and longest-lasting on the
e-mail list-serve of the American Bar Association Section on Taxation).
Id. at 89-92.
See, e.g., id. at 141 (citing Beatty v. Commissioner, 40 T.C.M. (CCH) 438
(1980), in which the “taxpayer stated ‘that if verification was required of
him then he was willing to forego the deduction as the price for preventing
the government from interfering in his private affairs.’”)
These are the miscellaneous itemized deductions, which I.R.C. § 67
provides may not be taken except to the extent that their sum total
exceeds two percent of the taxpayer’s adjusted gross income. Examples of
miscellaneous itemized deductions include I.R.C. §§ 163 (Interest), 164
(Taxes), 165 (covering casualty and theft losses), 170 (Charitable, etc.,
contributions and gifts), and 213 (Medical, dental, etc., expenses).
I.R.C. § 221(b)(2)(B) (West 2014) (reducing the deduction amount for
taxpayers with adjusted gross income over $65,000 and eliminating it
entirely for adjusted gross incomes above $80,000).
Id. § 25A(d)(2)(A) (reducing the amount of the Hope Scholarship Credit to
“the excess of the taxpayer’s modified adjusted gross income for such
taxable year over $40,000 for tax years prior to 2014 and $80,000 for
taxable years beginning in 2014, bears to $10,000”).
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deduction, which requires medical expenses to exceed ten
percent of the taxpayer’s adjusted gross income.63 This means
that the medical records used to substantiate potential
deductions will become irrelevant if the total expenses do not
exceed the specified amount. Thus, the computational
mechanics of certain deductions and credits disqualify many
taxpayers who otherwise would qualify, and, as a result, the
amount of tax-relevant information for those taxpayers is
reduced.
2.

Information Provided by Third Parties

While the taxpayer is obligated to maintain records and
provide tax-relevant information to the IRS, either on the
initial tax return or later by specific request, 64 the IRS is not
limited to obtaining information from the taxpayer. Indeed,
information about ninety-seven percent of taxpayers is
provided to the IRS in routine reports from third parties.65 For
example, a taxpayer’s employer is required to report payroll
information to the IRS.66 A corporation that pays a dividend to
the taxpayer must report it to the IRS, 67 as do interest and
royalty payors.68 Whenever a real estate sale closes, the closing
agent must report the seller’s identity, the property, and the
sale price.69 And any business receiving more than $10,000 (in
cash or checks) must report the identity, address, and the
Social Security Number of the payor to the IRS. 70 About
63

64
65

66
67
68
69
70

Id. § 213(a) (explaining that medical expenses not otherwise covered by
insurance are deductible to extent the expenses exceed ten percent of
adjusted gross income).
See supra note 30.
See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE 2012
ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 181. For example, a taxpayer’s employer is
required to provide payroll information to the IRS. See I.R.C. § 6051 (West
2014) (Receipts for employees). Similarly, payments of dividends, I.R.C.
§ 6042, interest, I.R.C. § 6049, and royalties, I.R.C. § 6050N, to a taxpayer
obligate the payor to provide information about the payment to the IRS.
Real estate closings usually obligate the closing attorney or the title
company to provide the IRS information about the seller, the property,
and the sales price. Id. § 6045(e) (West 2014). Those receiving more than
$10,000 in the course of business must report to the IRS the name,
address, and the Social Security Number of the payor. Id. § 6050I; see also
Treas. Reg. § 1.6050I-1 (2001).
I.R.C. § 6051 (West 2014) (Receipts for employees).
Id. § 6042.
Id. §§ 6049, 6050N.
Id. § 6045(e).
Id. § 6050I; Treas. Reg. § 1.6050I-1(e)(2) (2001). In 2010, Congress vastly
expanded third party reporting by requiring business taxpayers to file
reports on each person from whom the business purchased more than
$600 in goods in a year. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119, § 9006(b)(1) (amending
I.R.C. § 6041(a) to require reports on amounts paid by businesses “in
consideration for property.”). However, this far-reaching requirement was
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seventy-five items are reported by third parties to the IRS
whether or not the taxpayer is audited. These items are
reported as a matter of routine, not request.71
But in gathering information about the taxpayer, the IRS
is not limited to routine reports. It has broad legal authority
to summon information from third parties, including business
contacts, employees, and advisors.72 Even though the attorneyclient privilege and a similar privilege for accountants 73
are available to protect those advisors from being compelled
to testify in certain situations, no protection exists if
the information has been provided in connection with the
preparation of a return. 74 Generally, there is neither Fourth
Amendment protection for information held by third parties
(including the taxpayer’s lawyers or accountants),75 nor is there
Fifth Amendment protection.76 With respect to the information

71

72

73
74

75

76

quickly repealed the following year. See Comprehensive 1099 Taxpayer
Protection and Repayment of Exchange Subsidy Overpayments Act of
2011, Pub. L. No. 112-9, 125 Stat. 36 (repealing the addition to § 6041(a)).
Form 1040 Instructions summarize how to incorporate third-party
provided information into the Form 1040. This information has been
provided to both the taxpayer and the IRS. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 1040
INSTRUCTIONS 2014, at 10-11, http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i1040gi.pdf.
Generally, a summons to third parties may be issued only after the
taxpayer has been given notice that contacts with third parties may be
made. I.R.C. § 7602(c) (West 2014); see also id. § 7604; MCMAHON AND
ZELENAK, supra note 30, ¶ 47.02[1].
I.R.C. § 7525(a) (West 2014).
See United States v. Davis, 636 F.2d 1028, 1037 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding
that communications related to preparation of client’s tax returns are not
privileged); see also United States v. Clark, 847 F.2d 1467 (10th Cir. 1988)
(holding that taxpayer’s nonbusiness records that taxpayer’s accountant
had delivered to attorney were not privileged); United States v. Brown,
349 F. Supp. 420 (N.D. Ill. 1972), modified, 478 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1973)
(explaining that an accounting firm’s documents generally may be
compelled because they do not fall under the work product doctrine, there
is no federal accountant-client privilege, and an accountant’s notes do not
become privileged merely because they are based on statements made in
the presence of an attorney); MCMAHON AND ZELENAK, supra note 30, ¶
47.02[2][b].
Where a document is in the hands of a third party, there is no expectation
of privacy for the taxpayer, even if the taxpayer maintains ownership of
the record. See Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 332-33 (1973)
(finding that client had no legitimate expectation of privacy for tax records
held by his accountant).
There is no Fifth Amendment protection for records held by accountants
or lawyers. Id. (finding that an accountant holding the taxpayer’s records
was compelled to provide them because the taxpayer’s Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination adhered only to the taxpayer, not the
accountant); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976) (compelling a
lawyer holding a taxpayer’s record to disclose it).
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held by the taxpayer and no one else, Fifth Amendment
protection against compulsion is available—but limited.77
B.

The Tax Information Gap

The current system of providing individual income
tax-relevant information to the IRS has two substantial
problems. The first is that the burden on individual taxpayers
complying with the system is significant. The second is that
a great many taxpayers do not comply with the system, causing
a tremendous loss of tax revenue. Both of these problems
are ameliorated to the extent that third parties provide
information to the taxpayer (which tends to ease compliance)
and the IRS (which tends to ensure compliance). Both of these
problems reflect the information gap between the taxpayer and
the IRS.
1.

Compliance Burden

The tax compliance burden is the cost to taxpayers of
attempting to report their tax liabilities in a timely manner.
This requires knowing what information is tax relevant,
organizing it, and being sufficiently informed as to the tax law
and how to make the computations. The IRS estimates that an
individual filing the Form 1040, the most commonly filed
individual income tax return, will spend sixteen hours doing
so. 78 The record keeping requirements are the largest
component of that: eight hours. 79 The National Taxpayer
Advocate has concluded that individual “taxpayers find the
return preparation process so overwhelming that more than 80
77

78

79

The Fifth Amendment is not a defense for failing to file an income tax
return (e.g., when engaged in an illegal business), though the taxpayer
may claim the privilege as to “the specific questions for which a valid
privilege exists” so long as the taxpayer completes “the remainder of the
form.” 3 WHITE COLLAR CRIME § 19:93. See generally Garner v. U.S., 424
U.S. 648 (1976) (holding that incriminating disclosures of gambling were
admissible evidence and not compelled incrimination where they had been
made on petitioner’s tax return). Tax-relevant records that have been
voluntarily prepared by the taxpayer have not been compelled and thus do
not qualify for Fifth Amendment protection. U.S. v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 612
(1984). Arguably, at least some tax-relevant records may be required and
thus may not be protected by the Fifth Amendment. See, e.g., M.H. v.
United States, 648 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that records related
to the foreign bank accounts of a taxpayer fell within the scope of the
required records doctrine). Nevertheless, the acts of “gathering,
identifying, and authenticating” the tax relevant records may be
testimonial and therefore privileged. See JOHN A. TOWNSEND, LARRY A.
CAMPAGNA, STEVE JOHNSON & SCOTT A. SCHUMACHER, TAX CRIMES 238
(2008).
This number does not include post-filing time, such as time spent
responding to IRS requests for additional information. Estimates of
Taxpayer Burden, 1040 INSTRUCTIONS 2014, supra note 71, at 97-98.
Id.
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percent pay transaction fees to help them file their returns.”80
Tax compliance requires 7.6 billion work-hours a year.81 If it
were an industry, it would employ 3.8 million employees fulltime.82
The compliance burden is so high because the individual is
obligated to navigate a complex, regularly changing set of laws
that determines what information is relevant and how it affects
the taxpayer’s liability. The individual taxpayer’s gap of
knowledge about the tax law, tax-relevant facts, and how to
apply the law to the facts is quite understandable. The tax code
has over 3.5 million words, about three times as many as it did
in 1975.83 In hard copy form, the regulations and summaries
of administrative guidance and relevant case law take
nine feet of shelf space. 84 And the statutory provisions
themselves are technical and overlapping. By the National
Taxpayer Advocate’s count, a taxpayer interested in correctly
characterizing college education expenses must navigate eleven
different provisions, each of which has its own eligibility
requirements, definitions, income thresholds, phase-outs, and
inflation adjustments. 85 A similar count of provisions relevant
to characterizing retirement savings comes to sixteen different
provisions, each with different rules. 86 And both of these
categories provide benefits to the taxpayer. “It is not
reasonable to expect the average taxpayer to learn the details
of at least 27 education and retirement incentives to determine
which ones provide the best fit.”87 The burden on the taxpayer
is so great that, while sophisticated taxpayers are able to find
“loopholes,” unsophisticated taxpayers often overpay. 88 To
illustrate the last point, the National Taxpayer Advocate
pointed out that in 2006, thirty-seven million taxpayers failed
to claim a credit for which they were qualified.89
While the complexity of the tax law imposes a tremendous
burden on taxpayers, the law’s requirement that third parties
provide information to taxpayers significantly reduces that
burden. As mentioned above, employers and others are
required to report information to both the IRS and the
taxpayer, and about ninety-seven percent of taxpayers have
80

81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89

See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE 2008
ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 5, http://www.irs.gov/Advocate/NationalTaxpayer-Advocate's-2008-Annual-Report-to-Congress.
Id. at 3.
Id.
Id. at 4.
Id.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 6.
Id.
Id. at 11.
Id.

334

THE YALE JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY

Vol. 17

information provided to them this way.90 When third parties
are obligated to provide information, they must do so in a
particular format. The format requires the third party to know
and apply the relevant law so that it provides not only dollar
amounts to the taxpayer but characterizes the amount for the
taxpayer. The most common example is the Form W-2, the tax
statement issued by employers to employees. Box 1 of that form
provides not just a dollar amount, but also a characterization of
the amount as “wages, tips, [or] other compensation.” 91 This
puts the burden on the third party to characterize the amount.
The Form W-2 instructions to the third party are over thirty
pages.92 To reduce the taxpayer’s burden even further, the IRS
uses line 7 of the Form 1040 to direct the taxpayer to report the
amount from the W-2 box 1. 93 Similarly, box 4 of the W-2
informs the taxpayer how much federal income tax was
withheld, 94 while the IRS uses line 62 of the Form 1040 to
direct the taxpayer to insert the right amounts.95 Box 10 of the
W-2 characterizes for the taxpayer amounts paid for qualified
dependent benefits, which is to be reported by the taxpayer on
Form 2441, Part III. Box 12 of the W2 is the characterization
for adoption benefits. This is to be reported by the taxpayer on
Form 8839, line 20. Other important reports of information to
the taxpayer include the Form 1098, which instructs the
taxpayer how much qualified mortgage interest he or she paid
in the year,96 an amount that is deductible on line 10 of the
Form 1040 Schedule A.97 The Form 1098-E covers student loan
interest reportable on line 33 of the Form 1040. Box 1b of the
Form 1099-DIV characterizes payments as qualified dividends,
which qualify for a special tax rate and are reported on 9b of
the Form 1040. Indeed, there are over seventy-five items of
information provided to the taxpayer by third parties that the
Form 1040 instructions correlate with a particular line number
for the taxpayer. 98 Without the pre-characterization of this
information by third parties and the instructional correlation of
forms by the IRS, taxpayers using the Form 1040 would spend
far more than eight hours maintaining their tax records and
90

91

92

93
94
95
96
97
98

INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE 2012 ANNUAL
REPORT TO CONGRESS 181, http://www.taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/2012Annual-Report/FY-2012-Annual-Report-To-Congress-Full-Report.html.
W2 WAGE AND TAX STATEMENT 2 (2015), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/
fw2.pdf.
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 2015 GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORMS W2 AND
W3, http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/iw2w3.pdf.
1040 INSTRUCTIONS 2014, supra note 71, at 10-11.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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eight hours completing the return.99This third-party reporting
greatly reduces the compliance burden.
2.

The Tax Compliance Gap Is Substantial

The tax compliance gap—the difference between the income
tax liability legally owed and the amount timely paid—
is about $450 billion each year. 100 To put that into context,
consider that the Department of Defense budget is about
$673 billion. 101 The tax compliance gap is almost four times
the size of the Department of the Treasury budget (which
includes the IRS). 102 And, it is larger than the combined
budgets of the Small Business Administration, 103 the
National Science Foundation,104 the Department of Homeland
Security,105 the Department of the Interior,106 the Department
of State and Other International Programs, 107 the
Department of Education, 108 the Department of Housing and
Urban Development, 109 the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration, 110 the Department of Energy, 111 the
Environmental Protection Agency, 112 the Department of
Commerce,113 the Department of Justice,114and the Department
of Labor.115

99

100

101

102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115

Estimates of Taxpayer Burden, 1040 INSTRUCTIONS 2014, supra note 71, at
97-98.
Internal Revenue Serv., IRS Releases New Tax Gap Estimates;
Compliance Remains Statistically Unchanged From Previous Study (Feb.
6, 2014), http://www.irs.gov/uac/IRS-Releases-New-Tax-Gap-Estimates;Compliance-Rates-Remain-Statistically-Unchanged-From-Previous-Study.
Some argue the tax gap is higher. See, e.g., Eric Toder, What is the Tax
Gap?, 117 TAX NOTES 367 (2007) (criticizing tax gap measurement
methodology).
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF
THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2013, at 84 (2012),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2013/assets/
budget.pdf
Id. at 167.
Id. at 194 (about $1.4 billion).
Id. at 190 (about $7.5 billion).
Id. at 121 (about $55 billion).
Id. at 135 (about $13 billion).
Id. at 156 (about $60 billion).
Id. at 128 (about $35 billion).
Id. at 141 (about $41 billion).
Id. at 185 (about $18 billion).
Id. at 105 (about $35 billion).
Id. at 181 (about $9 billion).
Id. at 76 (about $9 billion).
Id. at 141 (about $37 billion).
Id. at 149 (about $102 billion).
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The compliance gap is attributable to non-filing,
underreporting, and underpayment. 116 Non-filing is the
smallest of the three sources of the gap, responsible for about
$28 billion.117 It occurs when taxpayers who should file a return
do not do so on time.118 Underpayment is the second smallest
source of the gap, at $46 billion.119 This is when taxpayers file
the return but do not pay what is due by the due date. 120
Underreporting is the greatest source of the gap—$376
billion). 121 This occurs when taxpayers understate income or
overstate exemptions, deductions, or credits.122
It is clear that third-party reporting to the IRS is directly
related to the taxpayers’ self-reporting the item. Third-party
reported information is “pivotal in causing taxpayers to be
forthright in their reporting” to the IRS.123 When a third party
has an obligation to report payments made to the taxpayer, the
taxpayer’s compliance rate for the item is ninety-six to ninetynine percent.124 For income items with no third party reporting
obligation, the taxpayer compliance rate is less than fifty
percent. 125 In other words, when a taxpayer’s employer
provides Form W2 wage and benefit information both to the
taxpayer and the IRS, or when a corporation provides Form
1099-DIV dividend information both to the taxpayer and the
IRS, the taxpayer is almost certain to report it. However, when
a taxpayer receives a payment that is not reported by a third
party such as the receipt of cash for services or purchases, the
taxpayer is unlikely to report it. When the IRS does not rely
only on the taxpayer’s compliance efforts in order to collect
information, it collects both more information and more tax
revenue. Third party information reporting not only reduces
the compliance burden but also the compliance gap.

116

INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., Tax Gap “Map”: Tax Year 2006 (2011),
http://www.irs.gov/pub/newsroom/tax_gap_map_2006.pdf.

117

Id.

118

INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., Understanding the Tax Gap (July 16, 2014)
http://www.irs.gov/uac/Understanding-the-Tax-Gap.
Tax Gap “Map”: Tax Year 2006, supra note 116.
Understanding the Tax Gap, supra note 118.
Tax Gap “Map”: Tax Year 2006, supra note 116.
Understanding the Tax Gap, supra note 118.
Jay A. Soled, Homage to Information Returns, 27 VA. TAX REV. 371, 371
(2007).
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE 2011 ANNUAL
REPORT TO CONGRESS 285-86, http://www.irs.gov/Advocate/National-Tax
payer-Advocate's-2011-Annual-Report-to-Congress; Schulman, supra note
1.
NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE 2011 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra
note 124, at 285-86
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Surveillance to Close the Information Gap

In this Part, I predict that over the next twenty-five years,
the IRS will increasingly rely on surveillance technologies to
reduce the compliance burden and compliance gap. Both the
compliance burden and gap have received attention from the
U.S. Senate Finance Committee, the IRS Commissioner, the
National Taxpayer Advocate, tax scholars, and politicians.
Their call to harness new technologies to solve these problems
must now be considered in the context of the information
technology revolution. Whether surveillance technologies are
used to eliminate the compliance burden and the compliance
gap ultimately will be a matter of political will, specifically
including the will to reform the tax system to fit the
technologies.
A.

The Information Gap Problem

As outlined in Part I, the tax information gap causes two
problems: the compliance burden and the compliance gap. The
compliance burden is the difficulty taxpayers suffer due to
inadequate information about how to comply with and
maintain the records for complying with the tax law. The
compliance gap is how much federal tax revenue is lost through
noncompliance. The tax compliance burden amounts to 7.6
billion hours a year of taxpayer time,126 and the tax compliance
gap costs the federal revenue $450 billion a year.127
Both the compliance burden and compliance gap have
received considerable political attention. As Chairman of the
Senate Finance Committee in 2015, Senator Orin Hatch
described the costs of compliance as equal to the economy of
New Zealand.128 Senator Ron Wyden described the compliance
process as “painful.”129 In 2011, the Senate Finance Committee
held hearings on the tax gap, during which Senator Hatch
NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE 2008 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra
note 80, at 3.
127 See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
126

128

Tax Complexity, Compliance, and Administration: The Merits of
Simplification in Tax Reform: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Finance,
114th Cong. (2014) (statement of Sen. Hatch), http://www.finance.senate
.gov/imo/media/doc/3.10.2015%20RELEASE%20Hatch%20Statement%20a
t%20Finance%20Hearing%20on%20Simplifying%20the%20Tax%20Code1
.pdf (describing the costs of tax compliance as larger than the economy of
New Zealand).

129

Tax Complexity, Compliance, and Administration: The Merits of
Simplification in Tax Reform: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Finance,
114th Cong. 1 (2014) (statement of Sen. Wyden), http://www.finance.sen
ate.gov/imo/media/doc/031015%20Wyden%20Says%20Comprehensive%20
Reform%20Needed%20to%20Simplify%20Tax%20Code%20for%20Middle
%20Class%20Americans.pdf (describing the tax returning filing process as
painful).
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testified that the “[t]ax gap is the great white whale of deficit
reduction. If only the government was able to collect what it is
owed, our deficits would be reduced significantly.”130 Senator
Max Baucus identified increased information reporting as one
of the most promising solutions to closing the tax gap, but
worried that increasing information reporting would
inappropriately increase the burden on the informationreporting third parties.131 He hoped there would be “ways the
IRS can harness new technology.”132
IRS Commissioner Doug Schulman articulated a specific
vision of how new technology could harness more information
and improve tax administration. Commissioner Schulman
described the IRS as “an information intensive enterprise,”
saying that what “really matters” to the IRS is “the
organization of data and ultimately the knowledge and
intelligence we extract from the information.”133 In this context,
he articulated his “long-term vision” that “the IRS could get all
information from third parties before individual taxpayers filed
their returns. Taxpayers or their return preparers could then
access that information, via the Web, to prepare their tax
returns.”134 Echoing the Commissioner and tax scholars,135 the
National Taxpayer Advocate Nina Olsen has called for third
parties to electronically report information to taxpayers to
aid them in preparing their returns.136 However, she went one
step further in her recommendations by suggesting that the
IRS use third-party reported information to prepare returns
for taxpayers. 137 On this point, she echoed President Barak
Obama’s campaign call to provide “taxpayers the option of prefilled tax forms to verify, sign and return.” 138

131

Id.
Complexity and the Tax Gap: Making Tax Compliance Easier and
Collecting What’s Due: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 112th

132

Cong. (2011) (statement of Sen. Baucus).
Id. at 2.
Schulman, supra note 1.

130

133
134
135

Id.
See, e.g., Jay A. Soled, Call for the Gradual Phase-Out of All Paper Tax
Information Statements, 10 FLA. TAX REV. 345 (2010) (calling for third

parties to provide tax data at a secure IRS website taxpayers could use to
prepare their tax returns, creating administrative efficiencies and
simplifying the return preparation process).
136 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE 2009 ANNUAL
REPORT TO CONGRESS 343, http://www.irs.gov/Advocate/National-Taxpayer
-Advocate's-2009-Annual-Report-to-Congress.
137 Id. at 344.
138 Barack Obama’s Comprehensive Tax Plan, 3, available at http://halebobb
.com/Obama/Factsheet_Tax_Plan_FINAL.pdf.
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Information Technology Revolution and the
Information Gap

These proposals for using technology to leverage tax
information for taxpayers have to be considered in light of the
revolution in information technology. If the IRS could collect
and analyze all tax-relevant information, it could lower both
the compliance gap and compliance burden. Presumably the
coming ubiquity of smart devices and the ability to process the
massive quantities of data generated by those devices139 could
enable the IRS to do so. How might the “minutely detailed
records of our lives” created by these technologies be used in
tax compliance? 140 Imagine that every day “rivulets of
information stream into electronic brains” at the IRS “to be
sifted, sorted, rearranged, and combined in hundreds of
different ways” to determine tax consequences.141 While the use
of this information for tax compliance purposes might be novel,
those rivulets of information already exist and are expanding.
These streams of information already flow from and through
government agencies and private companies. Government
agencies, “industry, employers, hospitals, transportation
providers, Silicon Valley, and individuals” are all “linked,
shared, and integrated.” 142 They use the “same technologies
and techniques” to gather information so that the “digital
fruits” can be shared between them. 143 And over the next
twenty years, those shared rivulets of information will swell
with the “growing gush of data” from the “internet of things.”144
Other government agencies, such as the NSA have taken
the lead in pursuing this growing gush of data, but the IRS
may follow their lead. Reportedly, the NSA’s goal is
intercepting, sorting, and analyzing much of the world’s
internet activities.145 The quantity of information processed by
the NSA is tremendous—it is estimated that every fourteen
seconds, the NSA processes information equal to all of the
information in the Library of Congress.146 But the NSA is not
alone. The government works with private companies in a
Big Data is shorthand for the technology that can process vast quantities
of data in very short times, mining the data for patterns—especially
patterns useful for predictions. It can be used to analyze physical,
transactional, and behavioral data about people. Julie E. Cohen, What
Privacy Is For, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1920, 1931 (2013).
140 Richards, supra note 4, at 1934.
141 Solove, supra note 17, at 1394.
142 Citron & Gray, Total Surveillance, supra note 5, at 262.
143 Richards, supra note 4, at 1958.
144 Clarke, supra note 18.
145 Richards, supra note 4, at 1934.
146 Neil M. Richards & Jonathan H. King, Big Data Ethics, 49 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 393, 401 (2014).
139
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public-private partnership designed to provide “contemporary
and perpetual access to details about everywhere we go and
everything we do, say, or write.”147 Over the next twenty-five
years, as we move towards 2040, the year by which these
details may be known to the agencies and companies,
presumably the IRS will be among those entities pursuing this
growing gush of data. This prospect gives privacy law and tax
law scholars a good deal to discuss.148
C.

Predicting a Tax Surveillance System

I predict that over the next twenty-five years surveillance
technologies will be used to reduce the compliance burden and
compliance gap, at least to some extent. The growing gush of
data is too valuable to ignore when contemplating how to solve
the compliance burden and gap. But technological and political
factors will either pave or block the way for increasing
surveillance to improve tax administration. Ultimately, it is the
political factors that will determine the extent to which the IRS
is enabled to capture the growing “rivulets of information”
streaming “into electronic brains.”149
1.

The IRS and the Growing Gush of Data

Consider how the IRS might use the growing gush of data.
In a world where government agencies and private companies
achieve “perpetual access to details about everywhere we go
and everything we do, say, or write,”150 we can imagine those
details flowing through electronic brains at the IRS for tax
analysis. With information about a taxpayer’s location each day
and night, travel, and purchase patterns and those of her
family members, colleagues, and customers, the IRS might
determine the likelihood that a particular residence is the
taxpayer’s principal residence, 151 that she regularly conducts
business activities within it,152 that some of those with whom
147
148
149

Gray & Citron, Quantitative Privacy, supra note 4, at 64.
Clarke, supra note 18.
Solove, supra note 17, at 1394.

150

Id.

151

For example, the number of days the taxpayer lived in his or her home
and the proximity of the home to the taxpayer’s place of employment,
religious congregation, social clubs etc., may be necessary to determine
the tax consequences on the home’s sale. I.R.C. § 121 (West 2014)
(excluding gain from sale of principal residence); Treas. Reg. § 1.1211(b)(2) (2002) (determining which property is taxpayer’s principal
residence).
Treas. Reg. § 1.121-3(e)(2) (2004) (describing sale by reason of unforeseen
circumstances—specific event safe harbors).
The nature of any business activities regularly conducted in a taxpayer’s
home (and the square footage of the home in which such activities occur,
such as meeting with clients) determines if any part of the home
expenses are deductible as a home office. I.R.C. § 280A(a), (c) (West 2014)

151

152

2015

Taxation and Surveillance: An Agenda

341

she shares the residence are dependents 153 or that one is a
former spouse from whom she is legally separated,154 or that
certain meal expenses155 are for business rather than personal
purposes.156 By comparing a taxpayer’s business expenses with
those of taxpayers in the same line of business, the IRS might
determine the likelihood that an expense was “ordinary” and
“necessary”, and therefore, deductible.157 By analyzing what a
taxpayer reads (where and for how long a taxpayer’s gaze falls
on certain screens),158 the entertainment a taxpayer pursues,
and where and how much time a taxpayer spends in relevant
places, the IRS might determine the likelihood that certain

153

154

155

156

157

158

(disallowing deductions for business use of homes subject to exceptions);
Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.280A-2(a) (deductibility of expenses attributable to
business use of home).
Determining if a child is a dependent may be especially important when
the child’s parents are divorced. See I.R.C. § 152(c)(1)(B) (West 2014)
(defining a qualifying child as having the same principal place of abode as
taxpayer for more than one-half of year); Treas. Reg. § 1.152-1(b) (1971)
(providing general definition of a dependent and listing special
circumstances of absences of less than six months).
Payments to a separated spouse with whom one is actually living is
relevant to determining the tax consequences of the payment. See I.R.C.
§ 71(b)(1) (West 2014) (defining alimony and separate maintenance
payments).
If you incurred and paid for meal expenses at the same time, while in
the same restaurant as those who paid your professional fees in the recent
past (or do in the near future), it seems likely the meal was for business
purposes, especially if there were not additional entertainment expenses
in the same evening. See I.R.C. § 274(a) (West 2014) (disallowing certain
entertainment expenses); id. § 274(e) (listing exceptions, such as for
meetings of employees or shareholders).
Information revealing that you travelled to a distant city, paid fees for a
conference where others in your profession also paid fees, stayed in a hotel
in which other professional stayed the same number of nights, and did not
incur expenses at nearby theme parks, day spas, or night clubs, indicates
that it is likely the travel was primarily for business purposes and thus
deductible. See id. § 162(a)(2) (describing deductible travel expenses for
trade or business); Treas. Reg. § 1.162-2(b) (1960) (determining whether a
trip is primarily business or personal).
For example, a business expense must be “ordinary and necessary,” based
on the normal expenses of those in the taxpayer’s line of business. For
compensation paid to be deductible, it must be “reasonable,” which is also
based on the taxpayer’s line of business. I.R.C. § 162(a) (West 2014)
(stating reasonable compensation that is ordinary and necessary is
deductible); Treas. Reg. § 1.162-7(b)(3) (clarifying that “reasonably”
generally means as would ordinarily be paid for like services by like
enterprises under like circumstances); see also Welch v. Helvering, 290
U.S. 111 (1933) (holding that business expenses must be customary or
expected in line of business).
The Kindle and Nook already track reader behavior, down to the specific
pages on which a reader lingers. Richards, supra note 4, at 1939.
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expenses (e.g., for raising horses) were non-deductible hobby
expenses rather than deductible business expenses.159
Over the next twenty-five years, it is likely that there will
be efforts to meet the need for more tax-relevant information
with technologies that can gather it efficiently and analyze it
reliably. The result could be technologically pre-filled returns
ready for the taxpayer to verify, sign and submit. While there
are about 145 million individual tax returns filed each year,
potentially tax-relevant information would need to be gathered
on anyone who may have income in order to determine if the
income meets the threshold for filing. As the tax system has
increasingly become used for purposes other than revenuecollection—such as delivering welfare payments through the
Earned Income Tax Credit or health care coverage though the
Affordable Care Act160—information on many individuals who
have no income would need to be gathered as well. This
routine, systematic collection of data on such a large
population—this surveillance 161 of the population—could
eliminate all compliance burdens on individuals, as well all
routes of evasion.
159

160

161

The line between deductible business expenses and non-deductible
personal expenses is particularly difficult to discern when the taxpayer
has a hobby that generates income, even though the taxpayer is pursuing
the hobby for pleasure rather than profit. See Treas. Reg. § 1.183-1 (1960)
(stating relevant factors for determining if activity is engaged in for profit
include taxpayer’s expertise, time devoted to activity, manner of carrying
it out, success in other activities, and elements of personal pleasure or
recreation).
The Earned Income Tax Credit program is the second largest cash or
near-cash assistance program for low-income Americans. It is a
refundable credit, meaning it not only reduces a recipient’s income tax
liability but results in a cash payment to the extent the credit exceeds
the liability. More than 26 million American households received benefits
in 2015, totaling $60 billion. Tax Policy Center, Taxation and
the Family: What is the Earned Income Tax Credit? in THE TAX
POLICY BRIEFING BOOK, available at http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/
briefing-book/key-elements/family/eitc.cfm (last visited August 11, 2015).
The Affordable Care Act is primarily administered by the IRS. The tax
return is used to report health insurance coverage to the IRS. The IRS
also receives the shared responsibility payments. Internal Revenue Serv.,
Individual Shared Responsibility Provision, http://www.irs.gov/AffordableCare-Act/Individuals-and-Families/Individual-Shared-ResponsibilityProvision (last updated July 20, 2015).
In defining surveillance, Neil Richards considers four markers:
First, it is focused on learning information about
individuals. Second, surveillance is systematic; it
is intentional rather than random or arbitrary.
Third, surveillance is routine—a part of the ordinary
administrative apparatus that characterizes modern
societies. Fourth, surveillance can have a wide variety
of purposes—rarely totalitarian domination, but more
typically subtler forms of influence or control.
Richards, supra note 4, at 1937.
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Technological Feasibility

This prediction naturally requires an inquiry into what the
relevant surveillance technology would require and whether
such a “Tax Surveillance System” could become technologically
feasible over the next twenty-five years. It seems most likely
that “barring some civilization-threatening disaster, the next
25 years of cyberspace will see a growing gush of data” that will
be collected and analyzed by “an increasingly rapid spreading
of interconnected devices into every aspect of our lives, in our
cars, throughout our homes, and, indeed, into our bodies.”162
This internet-of-things is predicted to include fifty billion
objects by 2020. 163 By 2040 it “could be a given” that all of
our activities are known by governmental and corporate
entities.” 164 Of course, accurately predicting the specifics of
future technological developments is notoriously difficult. 165
Only time will tell. But in the meantime private companies are
betting that “Big Data” and the internet-of-things and other
technological advancements will be transformative.
Yet, while these may be tremendously useful for companies
seeking profit, it may be that the tax system’s need for these
advancements would be significantly different. It may turn out
that much of what private companies are best at doing would
not easily transfer to tax surveillance. Private companies aim
to monitor, predict, and change consumer behavior. Their
analysis does not require legal-standard accuracy. For
example, a retailer’s attempt to determine who is especially
vulnerable to specific marketing efforts may only be accurate
two-thirds of the time, yet be exceptionally profitable and
impose no harm on the remaining one-third of subjects
targeted. However, the Tax Surveillance System would need to
analyze tax consequences within legal standards of accuracy.
Errors might violate taxpayers’ legal rights, result in economic
162

Clarke, supra note 18; see also generally Nick Bilton, Intruders for the
Plugged-In Home, Coming in Through the Internet, N.Y. TIMES, June 1,
2014,
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/06/01/dark-side-to-internet-ofthings-hacked-homes-and-invasive-ads; Nick Bilton, Some Predictions

About the Internet of Things and Wearable Tech from
Pew Research, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2014, http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/

163
164
165

2014/05/14/some-predictions-about-the-next-decade-from-pew-research;
Don Clark, ‘Internet of Things’ in Reach, WALL ST. J., Jan. 5, 2014,
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240527023036406045792965808929
73264.
Clark, supra note 18.
Id.
For analysis of the general overconfidence of experts with respect to
artificial intelligence, especially with respect to timeline predictions, see
generally Stuart Armstrong, Kaj Sotala & Seán S.Ó hÉigeartaigh, The

Errors, Insights and Lessons of Famous AI Predictions—And What They
Mean for the Future, 26 J. EXPERIMENTAL & THEORETICAL ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE 317 (2014).
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drag (over-taxing) or windfall (under-taxing), and even increase
tax administration and compliance costs. The profit-driven
data techniques that private companies develop over the next
twenty-five years likely will be of some use in designing the tax
system, but quite different techniques also would have to be
developed to make tax surveillance feasible.
The primary problem the Tax Surveillance System would
face is developing a system sufficiently intelligent to identify
tax-relevant information and issues and to find, interpret, and
apply the appropriate law. The system would not only need to
surveil a taxpayer’s purchases, but also to determine the
likelihood that the purchase was related to the taxpayer’s
business and, if so, whether it should deducted or
capitalized. 166 Even these basic issues can challenge an
experienced tax professional; automating a process to do this
work may be impossible. Any undertaking to “automate” legal
decision-making is tremendously complex and requires
multiple types of expertise. When automating legal decisionmaking, programmers must make decisions in order to
interpret the law and then translate it into computer code, and
they almost always lack the legal and policy expertise to do
this. 167 Even if a programmer has the requisite expertise,
computer codes have a more limited vocabulary than the law.168
The combination of this limited expertise and limited
vocabulary has led to substantial distortions of the law when
decision-making has been automated in other areas. 169 And
coding tax law would be especially complex. The complexity of
tax law is notorious.170 For example, some provisions require
not only interpreting text, but also interpreting Congressional
assumptions and purposes.171 In the tax context, basic issues
are sometimes exceptionally complicated; in the coding world,
even basic factual issues, like correctly identifying individuals,

166
167

Compare I.R.C. § 162 (West 2014) with I.R.C. § 263 (West 2014).
Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV.
1249, 1261 (2008).

168
169

170

Id.
Id. at 1255-62 (arguing that mistakes of this type led to hundreds of
thousands of incorrect benefits determinations in the Colorado public
benefits system to hundreds of thousands of incorrect benefits
determinations).
Bradford L. Ferguson, Frederic W. Hickman & Donald C. Lubick,

Reexamining the Nature and Role of Tax Legislative History in Light of
the Changing Realities of the Process, 67 TAXES 804, 806 (1989)

171

(describing the I.R.C. as the “‘lengthiest, most complex, most internally
interrelated statute on the books today”).
Treas. Reg. § 1.1002-1(b) (as amended in 1960) (providing that nonrecognition provisions are “not available either beyond the words or the
underlying assumptions and purposes” of the provision).
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have posed significant problems for automation projections.172
Consider how complicated identifying the taxpayer becomes in
the partnership context. Although a partnership has a
taxpayer identification number, earns income, and pays
expenses, those items of income and deductions are allocated to
the partners to be reported under their own taxpayer
identification numbers.173 These allocations may not follow the
same formula for each item, and, as a further complication, the
formulae may not be set at the time the underlying transaction
occurs.174
But tax law is not only complex—it is uncertain. The
length and detail of the Code notwithstanding, there is limited
and conflicting authority on many points of law. How would the
Tax Surveillance System be designed to manage such legal
complexity and uncertainty? It may be that, absent substantial
tax reform as discussed in Section III, it simply could not be
done.
Another technological problem that would impede
development of a Tax Surveillance System is the security of the
system. First, the system would need to be secured from
inappropriate manipulation by the taxpayer. Second, the
information would need to be secured from inappropriate
access by IRS and other government employees. History has
shown such inappropriate access to be a recurring problem.175
Third, the information—and its revelation of maps of activities
and webs of relationships—would need to be secured from
hackers with various motivations: those interested in identity
theft; those interested in espionage; and those interested in
detecting vulnerabilities in order to extract payment. 176

172

173
174
175

176

For example, identification problems in the automated no-fly lists are
notorious—and difficult to correct. Citron, supra note 167, at 1273-75.
See I.R.C. § 701 (West 2014) (Partners, Not Partnership, Subject to Tax).
See id. § 702 (Income and Credits of Partner).
See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-337,
INFORMATION SECURITY: IRS NEEDS TO CONTINUE IMPROVING CONTROLS
OVER FINANCIAL AND TAXPAYER DATA (2015); Stephen W. Mazza, Taxpayer
Privacy and Tax Compliance, 51 UNIV. KANSAS L. REV. 1065, 1102-03
(2003).
For discussion of the range of contemporary data security threats, see
Robert Beckhusen, Pentagon Warns: ‘Pervasive’ Industrial Spying Targets
U.S. Space Tech, WIRED, Dec. 13, 2012, http://www.wired.com/2012/
12/space-espionage; Andy Greenberg, Kevin Mitnick, Once the World’s
Most Wanted Hacker, Is Now Selling Zero-Day Exploits, WIRED,
Sept. 27, 2014, http://www.wired.com/2014/09/kevin-mitnick-selling-zeroday-exploits; Kim Zetter, Hacker Lexicon: What Is a Zero Day?, WIRED,
Nov. 11, 2014, http://www.wired.com/2014/11/what-is-a-zero-day; and Kim
Zetter, How to Protect Yourself From Big Bank-Card Hacks, WIRED,
Sept. 10, 2014, http://www.wired.com/2014/09/avoid-bank-card-breachhassle.
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Technologically securing the system would be no small design
feat and would be essential to such a system’s feasibility.177
A workable Tax Surveillance System would not drop into
place fully formed. Implementing such a massive program
would have to be piecemeal. The sequencing of program pieces
would be important not only for technical purposes,178 but also
for educating taxpayers and training government employees.
Acknowledging that the practicalities would require such a
system to arrive gradually makes its arrival more plausible.
Consider the incremental steps such a system might take.
The first step might be merely greatly expanding thirdparty reporting requirements. As discussed above, these are
essential to tax administration, 179 are widespread, and are
increasing. 180 Both the IRS Commissioner and the National
Taxpayer Advocate have envisioned widespread electronic
reporting of information by third parties to the IRS as a means
to reduce the compliance burden and the compliance gap. This
information would be reported to a site, which would then
provide the information to taxpayers.
A second step might be the integration of private return
preparation services into the project on a voluntary basis.
A very pale version of this already exists insofar as some
taxpayers use return preparation software that downloads
information from third parties. 181 These companies might
next develop ways to reduce their taxpayer-customer’s recordkeeping requirements throughout the year by monitoring their
location and travels, online activities, and electronic payment
transactions, electronically recording relevant information to

177

178

179

180

181

The current system has become an appealing target—and is a
vulnerable one. Jada F. Smith, Cyberattack Exposes I.R.S. Tax
Returns, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/
05/27/business/breach-exposes-irs-tax-returns.html?ref=business&_r=0.
In Colorado, the failure to test run the automated benefits system led to
disastrous consequences. Citron, supra note 167, at 1273-75.
Compliance for items for which there is a third-party reporting
requirement is about double what it is for items without third party
reporting. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE
2011 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 285-86, http://www.irs.gov/Advocate/
National-Taxpayer-Advocate's-2011-Annual-Report-to-Congress.
See, e.g., I.R.C. § 6050W (West 2014) (creating obligation for third parties,
such as credit card companies and Paypal, to report transactions
exceeding certain thresholds); see also Byron M. Huang, Walking the
Thirteenth Floor:The Taxation of Virtual Economies, 17 YALE J.L. & TECH.
224, 264-65 (2015) (describing how information reporting from services
like Paypal can be used to increase compliance with taxes in an online
context)
See, e.g., Import Fidelity Tax Information into Turbo Tax, FIDELITY,
https://www.fidelity.com/taxes/turbotax-discount/import (last visited Apr.
13, 2015) (showing that Turbo Tax and similar products already allow
downloading from third parties).
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address issues not covered by the payor-payee relationship
usually found in third-party reporting situations.
Both expanding third-party reporting requirements and
integrating private return preparation services might cover a
great many individuals, including those whose tax-relevant
information is mostly already subject to third-party reporting
obligations, those who claim only the standard deductions,
and those who use tax return preparation software that
electronically files the return with the IRS. With facilitation
by the IRS, third-party information reporters and returnpreparation software designers could cooperate and achieve a
significant reduction in these taxpayers’ compliance burden.
But these taxpayers—the ones with a high level of information
being reported by third parties and claiming only the standard
deduction—already have a low compliance burden. And they
already have a high compliance rate.
Ultimately, it is the taxpayers with low levels of thirdparty-reported information and low levels of compliance that
must be included if the Tax Surveillance System is to serve its
purposes. It is this project that would require extraordinary
technological developments, not only with respect to gathering
the information but, more so, with respect to the artificial legal
intelligence necessary to use the information. As a practical
matter, discussed in the next Section, this would require
substantive tax reform in order to fit the law’s information
requirements into what can be best gathered and processed
with the new technology.
3.

Political Feasibility

Ultimately, the arrival of a Tax Surveillance System would
not be so much a matter of technological capability as it would
be of political will. Political forces could modify the law to fit
within the technological capabilities that emerge over the next
twenty-five years. Yet, like technological feasibility, only time
will tell whether such a system could become politically
feasible.
Senator Orrin Hatch identified the most politically
sensitive issue when addressing the Senate Finance
Committee. He pointed out that the “government could close
the tax gap entirely by putting IRS agents in every family’s
living room and in every small business,” but, he said, “this is a
price that a liberty loving people, and their representatives, are
rightly unwilling to pay.”182 Politically, how would the benefits
of lowering the compliance burden and closing the compliance

182

Tax Complexity, Compliance, and Administration, Statement of Sen.
Hatch, supra note 128.
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gap be balanced with concerns over the electronic equivalent of
IRS agents in every family’s living room?
It is not clear how the anti-tax political forces would react
to such a proposal. Closing the tax gap, as Senator Hatch said,
is the “great white whale” of deficit reduction. Collecting all of
what is owed rather than only a fraction of it obviously would
allow rates to be lowered without lowering the revenue
collected. The anti-tax political forces articulate their concerns
in both economic terms183 and philosophical objections.184 Those
motivated by economic concerns generally oppose the current
income tax base or current rates. They are convinced that the
structure of one, the other, or both undermines economic
growth. Those whose anti-tax sentiment is more ideological, on
the other hand, are committed to reducing the federal
government. And that commitment presumably would be
threatened at least as much, if not more, by federal
surveillance programs as by federal taxing and spending.
Ultimately, the Tax Surveillance System debate would
become a matter for popular support or resistance. Would
voters be more motivated by the appeal of a lower deficit, easier
compliance, and significant tax reform, or by fear of widespread
surveillance? The strong libertarian impulse among some
Americans 185 would be at odds with moving towards a Tax
Surveillance System, regardless of the appeal to change details
of the tax system. Indeed, the words “Tax Surveillance System”
may conjure nightmares. 186 But popular opposition may be
broader than political libertarianism. Many might be opposed
to the “surveillant symbiosis” between government and big
companies that may lead to the rise of the “surveillanceindustrial complex.”187
183

184

185

186

187

Mitt Romney is one example of this. See Brian Montopoli, Analysis:
Romney Tax Plan Strongly Favors the Rich, CBS NEWS, Mar. 2, 2012,
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/analysis-romney-tax-plan-strongly-favorsthe-rich (“Romney and his Republican allies have long argued that tax
cuts will stimulate the economy”).
One example of this is Grover Norquist, who said “I don't want to abolish
government. I simply want to reduce it to the size where I can drag it into
the bathroom and drown it in the bathtub.” John P. Avlon, Republicans
Wisely Break with Grover Norquist, CNN, Nov. 28, 2012, http://www.cnn
.com/2012/11/26/opinion/avlon-grover-norquist.
Aaron Blake, Poll: 22 Percent of Americans Lean Libertarian,
WASH. POST, Oct. 29, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/postpolitics/wp/2013/10/29/poll-22-percent-of-americans-lean-libertarian
(reporting that twenty-two percent of Americans lean libertarian).
For some Christians, it might especially be a nightmare if the surveillance
involved biometric technology, which would dovetail with the apocalyptic
narrative of Mark of the Beast (a physically imprinted number for
commercial transactions). Revelation 13:14-17.
For perhaps the first use of this term, see JAY STANLEY, ACLU, THE
SURVEILLANCE-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX: HOW THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT IS
CONSCRIPTING BUSINESSES AND INDIVIDUALS IN THE CONSTRUCTION
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While anti-surveillance sentiment may be strong and could
eventually triumph, as a practical matter, most Americans are
not very motivated to resist being monitored.188 It may be that
within the next twenty-five years, surveillance for tax
compliance purposes will come to be seen as no big deal. The
Tax Surveillance System agenda seems most likely to be
settled by events, not debates. If Americans continue to be
habituated to surrender privacy for services, and if doing so
continues to seem risk-free,189 then the burden-free compliance
service offered through tax surveillance likely will be seen as
acceptable. If, however, Americans begin to experience more
harms from surrendering their privacy, resistance to increased
surveillance seems more likely. Widespread actual harms may
convince Americans to protect their personal information.
These harms may come in a number of forms: credit and cash
access problems caused by data breaches; automated mistakes
with irreparable consequences; weariness with the psychic
weight of ongoing surveillance; shifts in power between the
police and the policed; incidents of stalkers, kidnappers, and
murderers taking advantage of electronically accessible
personal information. Or, it may be a handful of incidences of
terrorists or enemy states doing so.190 Unless the incidents and
awareness of actual privacy harm become widespread, the
impulse to exchange personal information for personal
convenience likely will continue to grow unchecked. And if this
continues, it seems likely that within twenty-five years, the

SURVEILLANCE SOCIETY (2004), http://www.aclu.org/files/FilesPDFs/
surveillance_report.pdf.
While many Americans express concern for their privacy, only a very
small number say they have actually changed their behavior to avoid
being tracked. Americans’ Attitudes About Privacy, Security and
Surveillance, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (May 20, 2015), http://www.pew
internet.org/2015/05/20/americans-attitudes-about-privacy-security-andsurveillance.
Currently, people see the internet of things as a “gee-whiz phenomenon.”
Later, they will begin to consider potential problems, like the ability of a
hacker to take control of an internet-of-things-connected house or car. Or
they might begin to wonder, “why is my toaster spying on me?” Bilton,
supra note 162.
See ISIS Uses Social Media to Target Military Families, KTAR NEWS,
Oct. 2, 2014, http://ktar.com/95/1771653/ISIS-uses-social-media-to-targetmilitary-families (reporting that the Army Threat Integration Center
released a bulletin warning military families and listing precautions to
take); ISIS Threat at Home: FBI Warns US Military About Social Media
Vulnerabilities, ABC NEWS, Dec. 1, 2014 (providing warning from security
agencies to military members to scrub social media accounts of
information that might be used to target them); As ISIS Threats Online
Persist, Military Families Rethink Online Lives, CNN, Mar. 23, 2015,
http://www.cnn.com/2015/03/23/us/online-threat-isis-us-troops (reporting
military members and their family members’ concern over use of online
media information to target them).
OF A
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tradeoff between surveillance and lower deficit, tax reform, and
burden-free compliance will favor surveillance.
III.
II.

Discussing,
Discussing, Debating,
Debating, and Researching Surveillance and
Taxation

In Part I, I described the current system for reporting
taxpayer information to the IRS and the information-related
compliance burden and gap problems. In Part II, I predicted
that, over the next twenty-five years the IRS will be among the
agencies and private companies trying to capture the growing
gush of data. In this Part, I recommend several lines of
research, discussion, and debate about the IRS’s pursuit of the
data gush. The recommendations relate to protecting taxpayer
privacy and autonomy, determining the extent of legal
authority and constitutional limits and the need to coordinate
various statues, and the substantive reform that would be
necessary to create tax law that would be well served by a Tax
Surveillance System.
A.

Privacy and Autonomy

The prospect of a Tax Surveillance System raises
significant concerns about the privacy of taxpayers. A great
deal of the research agenda concerning how the information
technology revolution should affect tax administration must
focus on protecting the privacy of the taxpayers, even while
gathering and analyzing all of their tax-relevant information.
Some part of the solution to these problems would be reducing
and refining what is considered tax relevant. But even within
the settled-upon scope of information that is necessary to
collect, the agenda should determine how best to design a
surveillance system that values taxpayer privacy.
Privacy is most commonly understood by scholars to be an
individual’s interest in how his or her personal information is
collected, processed, and used.191 If privacy is the interest in
regulating the flow of personal information, the information
revolution’s shrinking of how much information can be kept
secret does not mean that “the age of privacy is over.” 192
Rather, it means it is the beginning of an age in which privacy
is more important than ever. The more personal information is
collected, processed, and used, the more important an
individual’s interest in managing how this happens. Regarding
privacy merely as the ability of an individual to keep
information secret obscures rather than reveals what is most
191

192

Daniel Solove describes the “control” theory of privacy as one of
thepredominant contemporary theories of privacy and one traceable to
John Locke. Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REV.
1109-1115 (2002).
Richards & King, supra note 146, at 409 (quoting Mark Zuckerberg).
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pressing about privacy and the information technology
revolution.
Of course, the interest in controlling personal information
was not generated by a technological revolution. Controlling
personal information has always helped us regulate our social
relationships and exercise our individual autonomy. Through
controlling what we reveal to others, we control the degree of
intimacy.193 Our most intimate relationships tend to be those in
which we have shared a “slow process of mutual revelation.”194
In social settings, privacy is our claim on controlling
information about ourselves. It is valued in that it guides the
development of our personal relationships. 195 Privacy is also
valued because it provides “breathing room” for the
development of our own personhood. 196 It is within this
breathing room—this zone of privacy—that we are able to
“develop and exercise” meaningful autonomy. 197 Without
privacy, we self-censor, suffer embarrassment, become
inhibited, and experience “powerlessness, vulnerability, and
dehumanization.”198
But privacy is not an individualistic value. Protecting
autonomous zones in which individuals can flourish with
limited intrusiveness benefits society. 199 Protecting
an individual’s autonomy redounds to the benefit of a free
society through the flourishing of expression, innovation,
experimentation, reflective citizenship, and a vital culture.200
Without privacy protection, individual activities that
contribute to the greater public good are impeded. 201 A free
society “ignores privacy at its peril.”202
A substantial part of the research agenda related to
taxation and surveillance should be dedicated to determining
how to gather and analyze tax-relevant information without
losing the public good of privacy. How should a system be
designed to harvest the right information while respecting
privacy zones in which taxpayers have breathing room and are
not dehumanized or made powerless? How can taxpayers be
sufficiently surveilled to gather the right information without
193
194
195
196
197

198
199

200
201

202

Solove, supra note 191, at 1121.
Id. (quoting Jeffrey Rosen).
Id.
Cohen, supra note 139, at 1906.
Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject
as Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1373 (2000).
Solove, supra note 17, at 1398.
See Daniel J. Solove, ‘I've Got Nothing to Hide' and Other
Misunderstandings of Privacy, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 745, 762-64 (2007).
Cohen, supra note 139, at 1905-1907.
See Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 PENN L. REV. 477, 488
(2006).
Cohen, supra note 139, at 1905-6.
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sacrificing innovation, citizenship, and culture? These are not
so much questions for legal experts as for psychologists,
anthropologists, and philosophers.
One of the difficulties of addressing these questions is that
the cultural norms as to privacy zones are being transformed
by the information technology revolution. It may be that what
would be necessary to comfort taxpayers in 2015 is radically
different from what will be necessary in 2040. With that in
mind, perhaps research will reveal that implementing the
system through steps appropriate for the relevant time is the
best way forward, presuming that what is appropriate will
change with time. Perhaps, as suggested above, the first steps
might be taken with respect to the information already
reported by third parties, as taxpayers are already conditioned
to have little control over this information. Perhaps the next
step might be a voluntary program providing a reduced
compliance burden in exchange for a greater degree of
surveillance. By making the sacrifice of privacy a matter of
taxpayer choice, a taxpayer’s interest in controlling personal
information could be respected. Then, maybe, the next step
would be to allow taxpayers to choose between two tax systems,
one in which less information is collected but certain benefits
are not available, and one in which more information is
collected and more benefits are available. For example, in the
simplified system, there might be fewer potential benefits for
higher education expenses but no need to monitor, for example,
the taxpayer’s degree progress. 203 Or perhaps the taxpayer
should be empowered to opt out of surveillance at certain times
or in certain situations, with the provision that there would be
no tax benefits available for expenses. For example, a taxpayer
might be able to opt out of surveillance of travel with the
consequence that none of the travel expenses would be
deductible, even if they otherwise would have been. By putting
the taxpayer in the control of the surveillance, the taxpayer
would control his or her personal information and be able to
define his or her privacy zones. The design problem would be to
balance these options for the taxpayer with the tax system’s
interest in collecting all of the relevant information.
At some point, empirical research into exactly what
concerns taxpayers and how those concerns might be addressed
would be needed. For example, if research determines that
taxpayers are most concerned about their personal information
being misconstrued, then procedures to ensure accurate
analysis might address the concern. If research reveals a great
203

See, e.g., I.R.C. § 25A(f)(1)(B) (West 2014) (precluding Hope and Lifetime
Learning Credits to cover the expenses related to courses involving sports,
games, or hobbies unless the course is part of the student’s degree
program).
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concern that the information not be misused, leaked, or
hacked, then measures to reduce the chances of misuse or
inappropriate dissemination would be the appropriate solution.
Research might determine that there is concern that
information would be used by agencies other than the IRS, in
which case the legal restrictions on the secondary use of
information by other agencies may need to be strengthened.204
Such use is already limited, but so is the scope of the
information
to
which
the
IRS has access. It may be that social research reveals that
what matters to taxpayers is not so much the control of all
personal information, but rather the control of certain types of
information. Presumably, taxpayers care less about controlling
the information about their paychecks, since their employers
already know the amount, than they do in controlling
information about their health, even though their doctors are
also privy to that knowledge. Protecting taxpayers’ privacy
means designing a system that values whatever
it is that taxpayers value when assessing the flow of their
personal information. It would mean designing a system in
which taxpayers feel neither dehumanized nor powerless.
It would be important to surveil taxpayers without making
them less expressive and innovative. The risk of surveillance is
that it reduces creativity, expression, and innovation.205 Over
the next twenty-five years, these negative consequences may
diminish as cultural norms develop to reflect the new
information technology. Of course, since surveillance for any
number of purposes will increase, concern for creativity,
expression, and innovation is not tax-specific. Yet, to the extent
that the tax system would be focused on surveilling
economically significant activities, policy makers should think
about how to limit economic chilling effects. If a business owner
is unduly sensitive to the tax surveillance system, such that
she spends less on a business development dinner than she
otherwise would, then the restaurant and waitstaff would earn
less than they would earn in a world without tax surveillance.
More pervasively and more perniciously, if business owners
take
fewer
risks,
incline
their business decisions towards safety, and temper their
entrepreneurial aspirations, the economy as a whole
might suffer. Surveilling economic activity could have the
consequence of chilling innovative economic activity.206
204
205

206

See Solove, supra note 201, at 521-22.
See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 139, at 271; Gray & Citron, Total
Surveillance, supra note 4, at 271; Richards, supra note 4, at 1948-50;
Solove, supra note 191, at 1145-46.
Interestingly, but not too surprisingly, when some individual income tax
return information was made public for a short period early in the
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How would the Tax Surveillance System affect the
taxpayer’s sense of citizenship? The pervasiveness of the
surveillance system could potentially make Americans more
aware of federal tax needs, laws, and politics. Indeed, the
system could be structured so that taxpayers are able to
provide ongoing feedback—communicating to the IRS as
taxpayers and to their elected representatives as voters.
Perhaps such a system would facilitate the broadening and
deepening of civic involvement of taxpayers, and improve
democratic participation. Or, it might have the opposite effect.
The movement towards the IRS pre-preparing income tax
returns has been criticized on grounds relevant to tax
surveillance: by making tax compliance less burdensome,
taxpayers may lose an important connection to the tax system.
For some commentators, the concern is that taxpayers would
be less politically inclined to resist tax increases.207 For other
commentators, the concern is a more general one about citizens
and their awareness of the laws and fulfillment of their
duties. 208 Becoming an object of ongoing government
surveillance no doubt affects how a citizen relates to his or her
democratic government, and how that relationship is likely to
be affected should be a seriously considered.
The effect of the Tax Surveillance System on a taxpayer’s
sense of citizenship would be complicated because the
surveillance system would not present itself as a “government”
system. In fact, there is no system of “government”
surveillance. Surveillance is a “linked, shared, and integrated”
project of both government agencies and private companies.209
A Tax Surveillance System would not be a system independent
of all others. It would be the integration of tax administration
systems
into
the
existing,
integrated
surveillance
infrastructure.
Currently, even if a citizen’s online life
mediated through companies such as Google, Facebook,
Wikipedia, Amazon, and Youtube is monitored by government
agencies, for most citizens, awareness of the monitoring is at a
low level or, at least, a low concern. However, if the monitoring

207
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twentieth century, one effect was increased investment in the tax-exempt
securities market. The publicity thus decreased the revenue collectible
from the income tax. This impact on economic behavior was one of the
reasons the Treasury Department opposed publicizing individual income
tax information. Cost of Publicity Scored in Treasury, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3,
1925, at 1.
President’s Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform, Transcript of Ninth
Meeting, Implementing a Return-Free Tax Filing Scheme (May 17, 2005),
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/taxreformpanel/meetings/meeting05172005.html (testimony of Grover Norquist).
Lawrence Zelenak, Justice Holmes, Ralph Kramden, and the Civic Virtues
of a Tax Return Filing Requirement, 61 TAX L. REV. 53, 56-65 (2007).
Gray & Citron, Total Surveillance, supra note 4, at 262.
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were used to determine tax liabilities, the awareness and
concern would be quite different. Receiving a tax return each
year reflecting surveilled activities would no doubt increase a
taxpayer’s self-awareness and would probably affect his or her
behavior. Google, Facebook, Wikipedia, Amazon, Youtube and
innumerable other companies would mediate the taxpayer’s
relationship to government. Integrating tax administration
into the joint surveillance system would mean integrating
one’s sense of being a citizen and a consumer, and the likely
consequences of fusing these and related roles should be a topic
of considerable discussion.
The cooperation between government and private
companies in surveilling citizens also raises issues of personal
autonomy. Private sector designs increasingly focus on the
virtual space in which consumers interact with the company’s
data collection system in order to gather more information
about the consumer than the consumer is aware he or she is
providing. They do this in order to exploit the consumer’s
personal vulnerabilities for company profit. 210 Even if the
information gathered by such methods were within the legal
authority of the IRS, such collection methods raise
tremendously important issues about citizenship and
governance in a free society. It may be quite effective to exploit
a taxpayer’s vulnerabilities in order to extract the most useful
tax-relevant information. And it may even be legal. But there
should be considerable debate about the appropriateness
in a free society of the government exploiting taxpayers’
vulnerabilities to gather tax-relevant information well beyond
what the individual likely believes he or she is disclosing.
Yet, what may look like exploiting a taxpayer’s
vulnerabilities from one perspective may look like merely
personalizing a system in a helpful way from another
perspective. It may be that the system could be designed in a
personalized way to increase a taxpayer’s own rationality with
respect to tax savings. Perhaps one taxpayer would be best
motivated by retirement account contributions, with a
spreadsheet of information; another by feedback delivered
through a digitized human face;211 and another by a few lines of
a favorite song while filling out a form. The techniques that
may discern a taxpayer’s vulnerabilities for manipulation
might be used to steer the taxpayer towards a lower tax
liability. But it is not merely whether the technology would be
210
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Ryan Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 995, 995,
1003-05, 1013-15, and 1033.
See generally Ryan Calo, People Can Be So Fake: A New Dimension to
Privacy and Technology Scholarship, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 809 (2010)
(considering how technologies that imitate human features implicate
privacy values).
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used to increase or decrease a taxpayer’s liability that should
be of concern, but also whether the taxpayer would appreciate
the way in which he or she was being monitored and
manipulated by a government agency.
The concern over how surveillance would affect individual
taxpayers should also consider the technological intrusiveness
of the system into the taxpayer’s life. Technological
intrusiveness saps a person’s time, attention, and energy by
interrupting his or her activities and sense of solitude.212 There
are great variations among individuals with respect to
sensitivities to technological intrusiveness. Relative to a college
student, a retired executive might have a greater potential for
ever-increasing tax rationality. Yet, the college student might
have a higher threshold for technological intrusiveness. An
Amish business owner213 might have considerable interest in
seeking out tax savings, but, given the sect’s resistance to
technologies widely used by other Americans, he or she 214
presumably would resist technological intrusions. Not only are
there individual variations in sensitivities across individuals,
but the same individual’s sensitivities may vary over short
periods. For example, a Sabbath observer would resist any
involvement or intrusiveness once a week, no matter his or her
preferences on the other six days. The Tax Surveillance System
should be designed to respect the autonomy of individuals as
members of a free and diverse society. Yet it would also need to
be effective. The Sabbath observing taxpayer should be given a
day of rest from technological intrusiveness. But the design to
accommodate this weekly rest should not provide a weekly
opening for tax evasion.
B.

Legal Authority and Limits

A Tax Surveillance System legal research agenda should
address how best to reform the substantive tax law to fit
privacy concerns and technological capabilities and should seek
to determine the limits of the IRS’s information-gathering
authority. The latter raises many of the same issues that any
widespread government surveillance operation would, but
should be framed within the broad authority of the IRS to
require and inspect records maintained by the taxpayer and to
compel third parties to provide information to the IRS.
212

See Solove, supra note 201, at 553-555.
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For a discussion of the success of Amish business owners, see generally
DONALD B. KRAYBILL & STVEN M. KNOLT, AMISH ENTERPRISE: FROM PLOWS
TO PROFITS (1995).
Although the Amish maintain traditional gender roles, Amish women
often run businesses. In some instances, their businesses have been so
successful that their husbands have dropped their other employment to
work in the wives’ businesses. Id. at 240-44.
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One issue to be resolved is whether the current grant of the
right to require and inspect records would be sufficient to allow
the IRS to require participation in a surveillance system that
automatically generated records for IRS inspection. Of course,
it is Congress rather than the IRS that would devise a Tax
Surveillance System, modifying whatever laws would be
necessary to authorize its implementation. Nevertheless, such
widespread information gathering may already be within the
scope of authority granted to the IRS, given that it is so
broad.215
Another line of research should inquire into how much
information the IRS might be able to obtain from third parties
such as Facebook. The IRS has the authority to summon
information from knowledgeable third parties. 216 In practice,
the information is provided by third parties merely after an
informal request by the IRS. 217 While Facebook has not
publicized how many requests for information it has received
from the IRS, it has publicized that it produced information in
response to over 35,000 requests from U.S. government
agencies in the past year.218 If a third party refuses to comply
with the informal request, the IRS can formally summons the
party and seek to compel production of the information in
federal court.219 Under current law, the burden on the IRS is
not high. It need only act in good faith and issue the summons
for a legitimate purpose. 220 There is no need for the IRS to
meet any standard of probable cause, but rather only to show
that “inquiry may be relevant” and that the IRS does not
already have the information.221
215
216
217

See supra notes 5-13 and accompanying text; see also generally Part I.A.
See Part II.A.
I.R.C. § 7602(a) (West 2014); MCMAHON AND ZELENAK, supra note 30, ¶
47.02[1].
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United States Law Enforcement Requests for Data, FACEBOOK,
https://govt
requests.facebook.com/country/United States/2014-H2 (last visited Apr.
13, 2015).
I.R.C. § 7602(a) (West 2014); MCMAHON AND ZELENAK, supra note 30, ¶
47.02[1].
United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 57-58 (1964); MCMAHON AND
ZELENAK, supra note 30, ¶ 47.02[2].
The court in Powell stated:
[T]he Commissioner need not meet any standard of probable
cause to obtain enforcement of his summons. . . . He must
show that the investigation will be conducted pursuant to a
legitimate purpose, that the inquiry may be relevant to the
purpose, that the information sought is not already within
the Commissioner’s possession, and that the administrative
steps required by the Code have been followed. It is the
court's process which is invoked to enforce the
administrative summons and a court may not permit its
process to be abused. Such an abuse would take place if the
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Would taxpayers have any Fifth Amendment argument
against participating in the Tax Surveillance System? The
Fifth Amendment provides limited protection in the tax
system. It is not a defense for failing to file an income tax
return, even when, for example, the taxpayer is engaged in an
illegal business. However, the taxpayer may claim the privilege
as to “the specific questions for which a valid privilege exists,”
so long as the taxpayer completes “the remainder of the
form.” 222 Tax-relevant records that have been voluntarily
prepared by the taxpayer have not been compelled and thus do
not qualify for Fifth Amendment protection. 223 However, the
acts of “gathering, identifying, and authenticating” the
tax relevant records may be testimonial and, therefore,
privileged. 224 How should this apply when tax records are
automatically generated by and reported to the IRS?
The broad scope of the IRS’s authority to gather
information and its constitutional limitations have not been
considered in light of the technological capacity to gather all
that is allowed. The issues raised by “broad, indiscriminate,
and continuous” surveillance225 are far-reaching and deep. In
fact, they are not unique to surveillance for tax purposes. Legal
scholars have already discussed similar issues in national
security and criminal investigations.226 But the Supreme Court
has only begun to consider how the information-technology
revolution affects constitutional rights. In light of United
States v. Jones, a case in which the Court considered law
enforcement’s use of a GPS-tracking device on a suspect’s car,
there is reason to anticipate that, in future cases, several
Justices will focus on the quantities of information gathered.227
If the Supreme Court becomes interested in this “quantitative
privacy,” 228 any widespread government surveillance system
would be implicated, including tax surveillance.

summons had been issued for an improper purpose, such as
to harass the taxpayer.
379 U.S. at 57-58; see also MCMAHON AND ZELENAK, supra note 30, ¶
47.02[2].
222 WHITE COLLAR CRIME, supra note 77, § 19:93; see also Garner v. United
States, 424 U.S. 648 (1976) (finding incriminating disclosures of gambling
made on tax return to be admissible evidence).
223 United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 612 (1984) (holding that because a
taxpayer had voluntarily prepared the records, their production was not
compulsory under the Fifth Amendment).
See TOWNSEND ET AL., supra note 77, at 238.
225 Citron & Gray, Total Surveillance, supra note 4, at 269.
226 See id.; see also, e.g., Richards, supra note 4, at 1934.
227 Gray & Citron, Quantitative Privacy, supra note 4, at 68 (citing United
States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 963-64 (2012)).
228
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Another constitutional issue raised by this type of
surveillance concerns the exercise of fundamental rights. We
know that surveillance chills behavior. Surveillance for tax
purposes could chill constitutionally protected behavior. For
example, when a woman exercises her constitutional right to
an abortion, the abortion’s potential as a deductible medical
expense means that various details—such as the gestational
age of the fetus—would be tax-relevant information. 229
Knowing the IRS was collecting this information might chill
her choice. Currently, the IRS is entitled to such information,
but it is unlikely that it would actually be collected or used for
two reasons. First, it is very unlikely many women know of the
potential tax relevance of the information. If a woman does not
know it is subject to IRS review, it cannot chill her choice.
Second, none of the information would ever be requested by the
IRS unless the deduction were taken (less than seven percent
of returns), 230 the return audited (less than one percent), 231
and, even then, only if the particular deduction were
questioned. However, under a Tax Surveillance System, the
monitoring of medical expenses would be routine. Would the
potential chilling of fundamental rights mean that the
surveillance system would have to be limited in substantial
ways?
Of course, the Constitution is not the only body of law
guiding development of a Tax Surveillance System. We ought
to think about how the system would interact with existing
statutes outside of the Internal Revenue Code. For example,
especially as to the information flow gathered from or through
third parties, the System’s design may need to be coordinated
with various statutory schemes: the Bank Secrecy Act of
1970, 232 the Privacy Act of 1974, 233 the Right to Financial
Privacy Act of 1978,234 the Electronic Communications Privacy
Act of 1986, 235 the Computer Matching and Privacy Act of
229

230

231
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233
234
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Only the expenses of legal abortions are deductible. Given the variation of
state laws, legality of the abortion would have to be determined on a
state-by-state basis, which would require consideration of gestational age.
Rev. Rul. 73-201, 1973-1 C.B. 140 (describing deductibility of medical
expenses of legal abortion); Rev. Rul. 97-9, 1997-1 C.B. 77 (indicating that
legality is essential to deductibility).
Less than seven percent of individual income tax returns reflect the
deduction for medical or dental expenses. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.,
Individual Income Tax Returns Bulletin 2011, at 9, 16,
http://www.irs.gov/uac/SOI-Tax-Stats-Individual-Income-Tax-Returns
(last visited Aug. 11, 2015).
See supra note 29.
12 U.S.C. §§ 1951-1959 (2013).
5 U.S.C. § 522a (2013).
12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422 (2013).
Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 18 U.S.C.).
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1988, 236 and the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996.237
Finally, research ought to be conducted on how other
government agencies might seek to use the information
collected through the Tax Surveillance System, and how this
ought to be regulated. Under current law, government agencies
are able to access information held by the IRS in certain
situations.238 Should greatly increasing the information held by
the IRS increase or decrease that access? Anticipating that
there would be an increased information flow from the IRS to
other agencies highlights the risk that the removal of
information from the tax context increases the chances that
this information will later be misunderstood.239 Even when the
context is superficially relevant to tax administration, such as
in economics or accounting, the tax-law meaning of a word like
“income” is quite different than its meaning elsewhere. 240
Words in the tax code often have technical meanings that are
different than the casual interpretations. For instance, one’s
“principal residence” may not be one’s home,241 and one’s child
may not be one’s “dependent.”242 Characterization in tax law
can also be at odds with other legal characterizations. For
example, a limited liability company duly organized, operated,
and recognized for all state law purposes may be non-existent
for tax purposes, with its employees, income, and expenses
appearing as its sole member’s own.243 Thus, the agenda should
include not only debating the terms on which other agencies
should be able to access the tax information, but also
discussing how those agencies could accurately translate
information from the tax context into their own.
C.

Tax Surveillance and Tax Reform

A final set of research questions relate to reforming the tax
law itself. The tax system we have is not designed for
the information collecting and processing technologies now
236
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Pub. L. No. 100-503, 102 Stat. 2507 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 5 U.S.C.).
Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 29 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C, 18 U.S.C., and 26 U.S.C.).
See, e.g., I.R.C. § 6013(i) (West 2014) (permitting disclosure to federal
officers or employees for administration of federal laws that do not relate
to tax administration).
Solove, supra note 204, at 520-22.
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though it would for economics or accounting purposes.
See, e.g., I.R.C. § 121 (West 2014) (noting that one’s principal residence
may be a property where one has not lived for as long as three years).
See Treas. Reg. § 1.152-1(b) (as amended in 1971).
For the disregarding of single-member limited liability companies, see
Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(f)(2) (as amended in 2006).
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developing. Changes in collection-related technology may make
a tax system optimal in one year, but not indefinitely. 244 A
surveillance-facilitated tax system would be a paradigm shift in
collection technology, and we should discuss how substantive
tax law ought to be changed to accommodate the shift. We
should not anticipate having the 2015 tax law administered by
2040 technologies. So, what should the tax law in 2040 be, in
light of these technologies?
These new technologies hold potential for solving the
compliance burden and gap problems. They also hold potential
for undermining privacy and the goods it protects and
promotes. But the administration of an income tax system
inevitably requires disclosure of information we otherwise keep
private. After all, we do not disclose our paycheck amounts to
others, at least not widely or frequently. Indeed, discussions of
money matters—even between spouses—tend to be taboo. 245
Yet, the income tax system depends on access to private
information, and not only about one’s paycheck or business, but
about one’s home, family, and health. Unavoidability justifies
some privacy burden on taxpayers, but not any burden. Under
the current system, only a minuscule amount of information to
which the IRS is entitled is actually collected. This does not
reflect a privacy policy, but rather other factors, especially the
very low audit rate. While Congress has made all sorts
of information tax relevant, and while the IRS has the
legal authority to demand any tax-relevant information, the
practical constraints on gathering and processing information
have meant that people have had to give relatively little
thought to the scope of tax-relevant information. But in a
system in which all of the information that is relevant is
gathered and processed, there should be considerably more
concern to carefully define what is relevant. The upside of the
Tax Surveillance System would be reducing the compliance gap
and compliance burden by gathering and processing all of the
relevant information; the downside would include the harms to
taxpayer privacy, which currently is protected only by practical
inabilities.
A fundamental project in integrating tax policy and privacy
policy should be assessing the current tax law in light of
privacy concerns. We need to devise some way to measure the
privacy burdens of the current tax law. Perhaps this begins
with measuring the information collection that is already
accepted without protest. This is primarily the third-party
reported information already collected on almost all taxpayers,
244
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Joel Slemrod, Optimal Taxation and Optimal Tax Systems, 4 J. ECON.
PERSPECTIVES 157, 175 (1990).
See, e.g., Joan Atwood, Couples and Money: The Last Taboo, 40 AM. J.
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such as paycheck and dividend amounts. 246 Reporting this
information does not appear to undermine social good, perhaps
because it involves dollar amounts paid to third parties or
received from third parties without a cultural expectation of
secrecy. This information is collected on most taxpayers, and it
is collected routinely.
The information routinely and universally collected should
be compared to information that is collectible only in an audit.
In an audit situation, the IRS has broad legal authority. As
noted, the agency is entitled to any information that may be
relevant to determining a tax liability.247 And it is during an
audit that the most sensitive information is at risk. For
example, an audit of dependent status might require the
taxpayer to disclose how many nights of the year the child slept
in the taxpayer’s house and how many elsewhere, 248 the
citizenship of the child,249 and whether or not the child has any
disabilities.250 If the audit covers adoption expenses, it might
include information about the child’s special needs,251 surrogate
parenting arrangements, 252 and the legal relationship of the
child to the taxpayer’s spouse. 253 Under a Tax Surveillance
System, all of this information, though rarely gathered now,
would always be gathered on all taxpayers to determine if the
taxpayer had qualifying dependents and how related expenses
should be characterized.
In thinking about this issue, we must not only examine the
privacy burdens if all of the information relevant under current
law were collected, but must also determine some way to
balance the potential privacy harms against the benefits to the
taxpayer and the tax system. While it is invasive to investigate
the disabilities, special needs, or surrogate parenting
arrangements of a child, the information may be essential to
accurately measuring the degree of the child’s dependence on
the taxpayer. The result of this accuracy includes benefits to
the taxpayer, such as a credit against tax liabilities for
amounts paid to adopt the child.254 Weight also has to be given
to the potential for evasion by the taxpayer, since the purpose
of the surveillance system would be to reduce the compliance
gap while reducing the opportunities for evasion.
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In this balancing, some current provisions likely would be
difficult to justify, like the medical expense deduction. First,
the deduction is not necessary for the accurate measurement of
a taxpayer’s economic income.255 Second, collection of medical
information tends to involve information that taxpayers would
not routinely share outside of particular social circles. Third,
not all expenses are deductible. For example, breast
augmentation may or may not be deductible. If its purpose is
merely to improve appearance, it is not deductible.256 However,
if it is to ameliorate a deformity related to disease, then it is
deductible.257 The invasiveness of medical care surveillance—
such as determining the circumstances of breast
augmentations—would rarely be outweighed by the tax
benefits to the patient given how few patients would have tax
benefits from the medical care payments. No medical expense
is deductible by those taxpayers claiming the standard
deduction, which is the majority of taxpayers.258 Even among
the minority who itemize, the deduction is only available when
the total expenses exceed ten percent of the taxpayer’s adjusted
gross income.259 The deduction is claimed on less than seven
percent of returns.260 A tax system that routinely collected all
medical information on all taxpayers, but that provided
medical-related tax benefits in such limited situations, would
be hard to justify.
The exclusion of gain on the sale of the taxpayer’s principal
residence is a more generous tax benefit.261 Like the medical
expense deduction, this tax benefit is a deviation from the
accurate measurement of income. 262 While the exclusion
provides a significant tax benefit, 263 determining whether or
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This deduction is listed on the tax-expenditure budget, a list of tax
provisions that deviate from a “normal” measurement of income in order
to provide a special provision. In the Joint Committee on Taxation taxexpenditure budget, it is estimated that the medical expense
deduction (including long term care deductions) amounted to about $10
billion in 2014. STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 113TH
CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL
YEARS 2014-2018, at 1-2, 31 (2014), available at https://www.jct
.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=4663.
I.R.C. § 213(d)(9)(B) (West 2014).
Id. § 213(d)(9)(A).
See supra note 46.
I.R.C. § 213(a)-(f) (West 2014).
See supra note 230.
The gain is potentially excludible under I.R.C. § 121. It is estimated that
exclusions under this section amount to about $30 billion each year, which
is about three times the medical expense deduction total. See supra note
255, at 26.
This deduction is listed on the tax-expenditure budget. STAFF OF J. COMM.
ON TAXATION, supra note 255, at 5.
I.R.C. § 121(b)(2) (West 2014).
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not the sale qualifies could become quite invasive upon audit.
For example, relevant information may include information
related to multiple birth pregnancies,264 illnesses,265 loss of job
or other change in job status 266 of the taxpayer or someone
living with the taxpayer, 267 as well as where the taxpayer’s
family members live, 268 the taxpayer’s banks, 269 and the
identity and location of “religious organizations and
recreational club with which the taxpayer is affiliated.” 270
Routinely collecting this information would involve monitoring
the health, employment profile, religious, and recreational
habits of taxpayers. Would taxpayers prefer a system with that
degree of monitoring, or would they prefer different tax
consequences of the sale of a principal residence? Presuming
that all relevant information is always collected invariably
shifts our perspective. Given the low audit rate, the chances
that a taxpayer would have to provide information on his or her
banking, religious, and recreational habits is miniscule, even if
the taxpayer claims the benefit of the exclusion of gain on the
sale of the home. In practice, almost none of this information is
ever disclosed to the IRS. The taxpayer does not even have to
disclose to the IRS that he or she is claiming the exclusion.271
However, if, under the Tax Surveillance System all of the
information relevant under current law were actually collected,
the balance of harms and benefits would shift, likely indicating
that a number of provisions’ privacy burdens would not be
offset by tax benefits.
Researchers might contemplate ways to retain beneficial
tax provisions while reducing their potential privacy burdens.
It could be that a systematic review of the case law reveals that
judges actually decide issues with reference to far fewer facts
than the current Treasury Regulations cover. For example, it
may be the case that, in disputes over whether a residence was
a taxpayer’s principle residence, judges do not consider the
proximity of the residence to a religious institution. Similarly,
it may be that, even though one judge considers reading habits
relevant in determining whether or not a taxpayer had a profit
motive or a hobby motive while pursuing a particular
activity,272 the best indication of a profit motive is actually the
relative ratios of the activity’s expenses to the income derived
264
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from the activity.273 It may be that the information technology
revolution itself could be leveraged in this research. Big Data
analyses may reveal patterns of relevance we would never
discern on our own.
In addition to privacy concerns, considerations of what new
technology itself does best would be relevant to guiding the
tax system into the technology revolution. It may be that
incorporating artificial intelligence into tax administration
means that tax law should be reformed to include more rules
and fewer standards. Artificial intelligence is better suited for
rule-making decisions. In some circumstances, it may be that
moving towards rules and away from standards in order to
allow greater room for computerizing legal processing is a
sacrifice of fairness. In her review of legal automation projects,
Danielle Citron concluded that “the emergence of automation
threatens to” give rules “a huge, and often decisive, advantage
on the basis of cost and convenience rather than the
desirability of the substantive results they produce.” 274
However, it may be that tax law in particular is better suited
for a move towards more rules than some other bodies of law.
While a system of artificial intelligence may accommodate a
great deal of complexity, the complexity ultimately should not
exceed what a taxpayer can understand and apply without
undue difficulty. This issue is best considered in light of the
taxpayer’s adversarial rights in the tax system. In the current
tax system, the taxpayer is obligated to record relevant facts,
interpret the relevant law, and apply it to the facts at hand in
preparing the return. The taxpayer does not defend what she
has done unless there is an audit and, ultimately, the defense
is to a judge, not an IRS agent. For example, a taxpayer who
takes a trip somewhat for business reasons and somewhat for
personal reasons is obligated to rightly record the expenses of
the trip but also to determine if the mixed-motive trip is
primarily for business reasons or personal reasons.275 So long
as the taxpayer believes she has a pretty good argument (one
with “substantial authority”)276 that the mixed-motive trip was
primarily for business reasons, she is entitled to deduct the
expenses accordingly. Not only is she entitled to give herself
the benefit of the doubt, but she is entitled to do so even if she
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The taxpayer’s history of income or losses and occasional profits are
factors to be considered in determining whether or not there was a
requisite profit motive, but alongside, for example, the taxpayers’ degree
of personal pleasure in pursuing the activity. See Treas. Reg. § 1.183-2(b)
(2013).
Citron, supra note 167, at 1303.
Treas. Reg. § 1.162-2 (1960) (covering travel for business, mixed business,
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thinks a court likely would disagree.277 But in a surveillancebased tax system, the system would collect the relevant data—
perhaps how many minutes were spent in the client’s office and
how many minutes were spent in a friend’s house—and
tentatively conclude whether the trip was more business
related or personal. The return would be drafted on that basis,
though the taxpayer would have right to dispute it and appeal
to the judiciary. Of course, for the taxpayer to dispute it, she
would have to be informed as to how the conclusion was
formed. The system would have to reveal how the decision was
made and how the legal authorities were interpreted and
applied in a way that the taxpayer could understand and
respond. This is a matter of what has been called “technological
due process,” meaning that these sorts of automated decisions
cannot be made within black boxes.278
Ultimately, transparency must be found not only in the
conclusions on individual taxpayer returns, but also in the
design of the automated decision-making process. It would
require a process with public notice, comments, and
hearings. 279 Commenting on proposed Treasury Regulations
requires tax expertise. But to comment on the process of coding
the law and regulations would require not only tax expertise,
but also some understanding of the computer coding process.
Computer codes have a more limited vocabulary than the
law.280 The combination of this limited expertise and limited
vocabulary has led to substantial distortions of the law when
decision-making has been automated in other areas. 281 This
makes the transparency of coding the project more important,
in that independent tax experts need to be watching for such
distortions. While tax experts may appreciate the complexities
of the law and different understandings of how to resolve
substantive legal uncertainties, they mostly cannot appreciate
the complexities of the computer code and different ways of
reflecting uncertainties in it. Part of the research agenda thus
must be reconciling the complexities of the tax law and
computer code, and doing so in a way that is transparent and
subject to public review and comment.
In light of these issues, it seems that the tax law of 2040
should be fundamentally different than that of 2015 if
revolutionary information technologies are to be integrated into
its administration. What we must contemplate are not so much
277
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the details of the current system and the challenges of
updating and fitting it to cutting-edge technology, but the
prospects for a tremendously reformed tax system. It probably
would require tremendous reform to build a tax system that
could be integrated with technology without unduly
undermining taxpayer privacy and autonomy. The system best
integrated with technology and most protective of privacy and
autonomy might not be based on income. In the past, in
isolated instances, tax base reform advocates have included
tangential privacy considerations.282 However, compared to the
current world where almost no individual taxpayers are
audited, a future, technology-driven world should push privacy
and autonomy concerns to the fore.
While the IRS has always been an “information intensive
enterprise,”283 it is the agency’s practical inabilities to collect
and analyze all of the information relevant to a taxpayer’s
liability that has protected taxpayer privacy. But, in a not too
distant future, “every animate and inanimate object on
earth”284 may generate data that the IRS is able to gather. Now
seems like a good time to start the discussion.
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